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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is comprised of three essays addressing the connections between
democracy and public finance at the subnational level. Chapter 2 focuses on varia-
tionwithin public expenditure, revenue, and debt at the state level in theUnited States
for the period 1977-2011 seeking to uncover whether there is evidence of efforts
by incumbents to manipulate state public finances to influence election outcomes.
I find that total public expenditure increased the year before elections, especially
during the period 1977-1994, but it is mostly driven by intergovernmental expendi-
ture. Meanwhile, for later years there is a sizable reduction in tax revenue during
electoral years, which results a debt increase. In Chapter 3, I extend the literature of
political budget cycles at the subnational level to include pension funding. I explore
the relationship between state pension funding and gubernatorial elections in the
United States for the years 2001-2014. I show that one is more likely to observe
the government and other employers undercontributing to pension funds during the
pre-electoral year. I also found fluctuations in the pension fund’s portfolio compo-
sition depending on how close a gubernatorial election is. Finally, in Chapter 4,
I investigate whether the credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and
Poor’s) adjust the timing of their ratings as a function of the electoral calendar. I
collect a novel database using credit ratings of Mexican states, and estimate panel
models for gubernatorial elections in Mexico for 2005-2015. My results indicate
that credit rating agencies delay announcing rating downgrades until after elections,
especially when elections are very competitive.
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1C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation focuses on the political economy of state public finance. It con-
tains three chapters which detail how state public finance changes when there is a
gubernatorial election on the horizon. The chapters follow a logical order. It goes
from the traditional study of public finance and elections, to unexplored indicators
of the political budget cycle, to new players in the budgetary game.
The chapter titled “Public Finances for Electoral Purposes? Evidence from US
States” takes the traditional approach of studying political budget cycles by observing
how indicators of public finance vary depending on how soon a gubernatorial
election is. For this, I estimate variationwithin state expenditure, revenue, and public
debt, for states in the US, between the years 1977 and 2011. This chapter extends
the current literature by analyzing an extended time period, and by considering three
indicators of public finance, instead of only focusing on expenditure. I find that total
public expenditure increased during the year before the elections, especially for
the first half of the sample, but this increase is mostly driven by intergovernmental
expenditure. Meanwhile, for more recent years there is a sizable reduction in tax
revenue during electoral years which results in debt increases.
The traditional approach to studying political budget cycles uses cash-based ac-
counting. This underestimates the real magnitude of the distortions generated by
manipulating public finances for electoral purposes. For example, if wages are
persistent over time, an increase in wages today for political reasons will translate
into a higher fiscal pressure during the next period. Therefore, it would be more
convenient if the analysis of political budget cycles were to use accrual-based ac-
counting in order to fully understand the economics of the cycle. In chapter 3, I
2take a step in this direction. In this chapter, titled “Political Pension Contribution
Cycles, Evidence from US States”, I incorporate pension funding into the study of
political cycles. Pension fund obligations are not considered public debt. However,
state and local pension funding decisions made today will impact the balance sheet
of state governments in the future. Undercontribution to, or changes in pension fund
assets will determine how underfunded pension plans will be, and therefore how
much extraordinary resources will be required to pay for pension fund obligations.
In this chapter I explore how contributions calculated as a percentage of the Annual
Required Contribution (ARC) change as a function of the gubernatorial electoral
calendar. In this chapter I also investigate whether portfolio composition changes
during this cycle; in particular, I study how the percentage invested in equity varies
during electoral periods. I show there is undercontribution to pension funds during
pre-electoral years. I also find that investments in more conservative assets are made
in non-electoral years.
After observing the results of the first two chapters, I can conclude that there
is evidence of changes in public finances as a function of the electoral calendar.
In anticipation of this, there are institutional arrangements which are in place so
that there are incentives for the government to fulfill their roles in an efficient
and optimal way, preventing these manipulations. In the fourth and last chapter
titled “Political Credit Rating Cycles: Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections in
Mexico”, I explore one of these institutions: The Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs).
CRAs are in charge of analyzing different indicators of public finance (including
budget and pension funding) and assigning a rating to each entity they rate. So,
in principle, CRAs should adjust their ratings if there are changes in the status of
public finances. However, they are not functioning appropriately. The problem with
CRAs as monitors of public finances is that the structure of the market generates
a conflict of interest which results in inaccurate ratings. In this chapter I analyze
3whether CRAs are delaying announcements of credit rating downgrades during
electoral periods. For this I collected a novel database based on press releases and
credit rating reports for Mexican states and observe how these ratings fluctuate as
a function of the gubernatorial electoral calendar. My results indicate that CRAs
delay announcing rating downgrades until after elections, especially when elections
are very competitive.
4C h a p t e r 2
PUBLIC FINANCES FOR ELECTORAL PURPOSES?
EVIDENCE FROM US STATES
2.1 Abstract
In this chapter I analyze variation within public expenditure, revenue, and debt at the
state level in the United States for the period 1977-2011 to uncover whether there is
evidence of efforts by incumbent politicians to influence the outcome of elections. I
find that total public expenditure increased during the year before elections especially
for the period 1977-1994, but is mostly driven by intergovernmental expenditure.
Meanwhile, after 1994, there is a sizable reduction in tax revenue during electoral
years which results in a debt increase.
2.2 Introduction
“When you think economics, think elections. When you think elections, think eco-
nomics.”
-Edward Tufte (1978)
In light of the recent global financial crisis, the dynamics and efficiency of public
finance have reemerged as central parts of public discourse. In the past few years
in the U.S. we have seen a federal government shutdown, cities like Detroit and San
Bernardino are going bankrupt, debates are raging about the public deficit, taxes,
health care services, and many other important issues of public finance. States were
particularly affected by the crisis: in the second quarter of 2009, personal income
tax revenue fell 27% from the previous year, contributing to an overall decline of
17% in total state tax collections (Gordon, 2012; Kiewiet and McCubbins, 2014).
The recovery has been slow. In real terms state tax revenues as well as state and
5local government consumption and investment were 5% lower in 2013 than in 2008
(Kiewiet and McCubbins, 2014). Perhaps it is now more important than ever to
understand the motivation for each budgetary decision and cut down the electorally
motivated public expenditures and debt.
In this chapter I examine the dynamics of public finance at the state level in the
United States. I want to determine whether budgetary variations are politically
motivated rather than part of an efficient economic plan. Are adjustments to public
finance a function of the electoral calendar? In principle, state budgetary decisions
should be made in response to the situation of the economy and the necessities and
requirements of its inhabitants, not because an election is on the horizon.
As Nordhaus first showed, in an incumbent’s term in office there is a predictable
pattern in policy, in which there is austerity in the term’s early years and more
flexibility before elections (Nordhaus, 1975). Indeed, Tufte (1980) demonstrated
that economic movements in the months preceding an election can tip the political
balance and decide the election’s outcome. The electorate rewards incumbents
for prosperity and punishes them for recession. So spurts in economic growth in
the months immediately preceding an election can benefit the incumbent. These
spurts can come in different forms and affect governments differently; for example,
in his famous paper, Hibbs (1977) acknowledged that conservative governments
benefit from inflation reduction in the months preceding elections, while liberal
governments benefit more from reductions in unemployment. Unfortunately (or
fortunately), governments do not have full control of the economy, but more so of
the budget, as it was mentioned by Blais and Nadeau (1992): “... governments
control their budgets whereas they can only hope to have some indirect impact on
the economy; economic performance is the outcome of a myriad of decisions taken
by consumers, workers, producers as well as governments, national and local, in
the country but also internationally”. Therefore, it is more useful to study the cycle
6using the budget (political budget cycle) instead of the general state of the economy
(political business cycle).
The literature on political budget cycles has traditionally focused on the national
level. In particular, for the United States, Drazen (2001) compiled the literature of
political budget cycles. He concludes that aggregate economic conditions before
an election have a significant effect on voting patterns, but there is no significant
increase in aggregate economic activity prior to elections in either the United States
or other OECD countries. However, if we use fiscal policy as an alternative indicator
of the existence of a political budget cycle, the conclusion is different: there is
evidence of pre-electoral increases in transfers and other fiscal policy instruments
in a number of countries. In the United States, this effect appears the strongest prior
to 1980 (Drazen, 2001).
At the subnational level the literature is less developed, not only for the study of the
political budget cycles themselves, but also for the determinants of public finance.
As Garand, Ultrick, and Xu (2013) mention “It would be only a slight exaggeration
to suggest that the study of state fiscal policy has become somewhat of a forgotten
area of study”. Paradoxically, states are a better setting to examine fiscal policy and
political budget cycles, as Alt and Rose (2007) have argued: “Restricting the domain
to U.S. states holds relatively constant a wide range of socio-economic, political,
and cultural characteristics that might otherwise confound the analysis”. States are
more comparable between themselves as opposed to making comparisons between
nations. Moreover, states are unable to expand the monetary base so they have to
fund expenditure either by taxes or by debt making the cycle evident using these
indicators.
Can we extrapolate Drazen’s observations regarding the existence of a political bud-
get cycle at the national level to the state level? John E. Chubb (1988) showed that
7state economic conditions, and the assumption of gubernatorial responsibility for
them, have a small but significant impact on gubernatorial election outcomes. Addi-
tional public monetary resources might be helpful to the governor to win elections.
They can be used to generate employment or increase public works, or they can be
directly spent in transfers to the voters. To pay for these extraordinary expenditures,
politicians need to tap into additional financial resources. One alternative would be
to increase taxes. However, taxes are unpopular in general so increasing them would
diminish, or even reverse the effect of the additional expenditure in terms of votes.
An alternative way to fund additional expenditure is by increasing public debt. It is
true that debt has to be paid by the taxpayers eventually, but it is possible that voters
are not aware of this, or are biased towards immediate consumption. Voters might
see debt as windfall revenue as opposed to taxation. Voters are less interested in
accountability when resources come from windfalls and not from taxation (Paler,
2013).
The electoral calendar is just one possible determinant of state fiscal policy. There
are several other determinants which have been studied through the years. The vast
majority of the literature focuses on a limited number of determinants in the states.
One exception is Merrifield (2000), who estimates a very large model including
ideological, institutional, demographic, and economic variables in order to find
correlations between these variables and the indicators of fiscal policy. He finds
that ideological and demographic variables are important determinants of tax and
revenue, while institutional ones are less influential. Merrifield’s model contains
over two dozen independent variables, but he only uses 130 observations taken from
pooled cross-samples spanning three non-consecutive years to determine which
variables are most influential. This means that his results are not very precise and
cannot provide us with much information on the role of any particular variable.
Even with the limited nature of his sample, Merrifield’s finding that institutional
8restrictions are relative unimportant determinants of public finance deserves atten-
tion. In principle, institutional constraints should limit the ability of public officials
at the state level to manipulate the budget, in particular to generate a budget cycle.
However, the effectiveness of tax and expenditure limits (TEL) has been highly
questioned in the literature. Most studies about these limitations found that they
were mostly ineffective. Cox and Lowery (1990) find that the behavior of states
with limitations was similar to those with no limitations. Where differences are
observed, they are as often as not the direction of what might be expected. Bails
(1990) also shows that TELs had virtually no impact on the growth of statewide
expenditures or revenues, and thus concludes that TELs as presently constructed are
an ineffective means of limiting growth in state budgets. Kousser (2008) has also
shown that TELs are ineffective in controlling expenditure at the state level.
With respect to public debt we reach a similar conclusion. Kiewiet and Szakaly
(1996) find that most of institutional limitations are ineffective in controlling the
increase in debt, the only exception being debt approval by referendum. The reason
behind the ineffectiveness of institutional limitations in public finance might be
that money is fungible and can easily move from one account to another while
simultaneously complying with the letter of the law (McCubbins and McCubbins,
2013). These claims, however, are not undisputed. Rose (2006) finds that states that
restrict the closing of budget gaps with burrowed funds make the political budget
cycle negligible. New (2010) distinguishes TELs by origin and finds that TELs
which were originated from ballot initiatives actually reduce government growth,
but this is not the case for TELs with legislative origins. A more in-depth discussion
of the literature on TELs can be found in Rose (2010).
Another branch of the literature has focused on the political determinants of state
public finance. Some scholars have studied how the item veto power of the governor
modifies the dynamics of public finance. For example, Nice (1988) finds no evidence
9that the item veto restrains spending. On the other hand, Alm and Evers (1991) find
that the effectiveness of the item veto depends largely upon the political parties of
the governor and legislature, with the item veto more likely having a negative impact
on expenditures in those states in which the parties differ. Partisanship has been
studied on its own as well. Lowry, Alt, and Ferree (1998) find that Democrats are
rewarded for unexpected, moderate increases in fiscal scale under unifiedDemocratic
government but punished for fiscal cuts. These results are symmetrically opposite
for Republicans. They also find support for the conjecture that accountability for
state-level policy is stronger when one party controls the executive and legislative
branches. Rogers and Rogers (2000) find that greater political competition in
the race for governor acts as a check against bigger government. Alt, Bueno de
Mesquita, and Rose (2011) find that economic growth is higher and taxes, spending,
and borrowing costs are lower under reelection-eligible incumbents than under
term-limited incumbents, and under reelected incumbents than under first-term
incumbents.
There is also a side of the literature which is more skeptical of political factors as
determinants of public finance. Ellis and Schansberg (1999) find that economic,
institutional, and demographic variables are important determinants of public debt,
meanwhile political variables such as partisanship or control of the legislature are
irrelevant for debt financing. Gilligan and Matsusaka (2001) use historical evidence
from the first half of the 20th century, to show that it is the size of the state legislature
and not its partisanship that is related to public expenditure.
As we can see, there are several pieces of literature regarding political variables as
determinants of fiscal policy. However, the literature related to public finance and
the timing of gubernatorial elections in the US is less developed. In other countries
these have been explored in various occasions. For Canada, Blais andNadeau (1992)
found an expenditure increase of 1% in provinces in electoral years during 1951-
10
1984. Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) show that the predilection for provincial
governments of all political stripes to increase taxes is temporarily halted during
electoral periods, and also show expenditure increases in highly visible areas during
1966-1997. For Portugal, Veiga and Veiga (2006) found an increase in expenditure
and deficit and a reduction in taxes in municipalities for the period 1979-2001. For
West Germany, Galli and Rossi (2002) found increases in total expenditure, financed
by public deficit at the Lander level for years 1974-1994.
In the United States, Melchior et al. (1993) analyzed the local level in urban areas
(more than 100,000 people) for the period 1978-1985, and found that there was a
disproportionate tendency for mayor-councils to have the lowest tax increase in the
fiscal year of an election, but without an increase in public expenditure. At the state
level two pieces of the literature explore this relationship. Using panel data from
1979-1999, Rose (2006) finds evidence of political business cycles in deficits and
spending, but not taxes. In this paper, I revisit this conclusion by incorporating more
recent data, which provides evidence of a more pronounced cycle measured with
tax revenue. I also correct a methodological problem of this paper, by removing the
yearly fixed effects in its estimations. Including yearly fixed effects is problematic
since most gubernatorial electoral years are performed on even years, and most of
them are two years after the presidential electoral year. This makes the vector of
gubernatorial elections almost collinear with the yearly fixed effects and makes its
interpretation complicated.
The second paper in this area of research is Alt and Rose (2007). They analyze
factors that influence the political budget cycle in the level of public spending at the
state level during 1974-1999. They search for determinants that made the political
budget cycle larger. They accomplished this by using as dependent variable the
difference between the expenditure per capita for the electoral year and for the
middle of the electoral cycle (two years before the election). However, I find their
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approach can be improved in several ways. First, their approach reduces by half
the number of studied years by only considering the electoral year and the year
in the middle of the cycle. Meanwhile, there are interesting dynamics in the year
immediately before and after the election. Second, they only focus on expenditure,
and this was perhaps the best approach for the time frame they studied, but the cycle
could be reflected in other indicators of public finance as time goes on. To account
for this, I use all expenditure, revenue, and debt to measure the cycle. Third, they
estimate the cross effects of different variables with gubernatorial electoral years,
but many of these variables are themselves problematic. For example, they use
approval rating of the governor as proxy of electoral competitiveness; however this
variable is highly endogenous since we expect that the unobserved spending mood
of the governor would be correlated with her approval in first place. Instead, I use a
proxy of competitiveness that is independent of the popularity of the governor and
is explained in the methodology section below.
2.3 Hypotheses and Model
In order to acknowledge the existence of a fiscal political budget cycle at the state
level I analyze the three main components of public finance: expenditure, revenue,
and debt. In order to make comparisons among states of very different sizes, my
variables are presented in per capita terms. My hypotheses are the following: 1. I
expect increases in public state expenditure levels in electoral years, 2. I expect a
reduction of revenue in electoral years, and 3. I expect public debt to increase in
these years.
To test the hypotheses I use fixed and random effects models with panel data. I
incorporate yearly data that includes expenditure by state, tax revenue, and level of
state debt, and takes into account electoral years. I propose the following model:
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∆Yt = α +
3∑
k=1
βk · electionyeark,t + γ · Xt + ut,
where ∆Yt is the change in per capita terms of the variable of interests in year t with
respect to the same variable in year t−1. The variable of interest can be expenditure,
revenue, or public debt. Variables electionyeark,t are a series of dummies which
indicate the year in the electoral cycle in year t. I include the year before the elections,
the electoral year itself, and the year after the elections, the year in the middle of the
cycle being the omitted category. Xt is the matrix of covariates and ut is the residual
term. The parameters of interests are βk . My baseline estimations include state fixed
effects. With this, I control for unobserved time-invariant patterns of expenditure
inherent to each state, including the institutional framework. I also present my
results for the random effects model, which is also useful to test hypothesis when
making partitions of the data.
I make three interesting partitions of the data. The first is to divide my sample in
half: the earlier years against the most recent ones. This allows finding how the
political budget cycle has been changing over time, and is also useful to revisit the
current literature regarding the topic. The second is between states which have Tax
and Expenditure Limitations and states that do not. This has a double objective:
to observe if these rules are serving their purpose, and to see how they change the
political budget cycle. Finally, I divide the sample in states which have gubernatorial
election during the same year as the presidential and other states. This is important
since the presidential election is every four years (same as gubernatorial elections)
and could be confounding the analysis.
In my estimations I include other variables which change over time and could be
affecting indicators of public finance. These variables are change in unemployment,
the Hoolbrook Van Dunk index of electoral competitiveness (HVD), the party of
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the governor, and if the state has a unified government.
2.4 Data
The variables of interests are changes in total expenditure, tax revenue, and debt
for states in the US for the period 1977-2011. All amounts are expressed in per
capita terms in 2010 US Dollars. The source of this data is the United States Census
Bureau State Government Finances (2016), and the United States Census Bureau
Population and Housing Unit Estimates (2016).
For public expenditure, I use the canonical indicator of total expenditure, a broad
measure that comprises nearly all state level spending. For state revenue, I focus
on tax revenue, since the state has more control over it compared to other types of
revenue such as intergovernmental revenue. For debt, I use Debt at the end of the
fiscal year this being defined as all interest-bearing short-term credit obligations
and all long-term credit obligations incurred in the name of the government and all
its dependent agencies. This includes all debt, whether backed by the government’s
full faith and credit or non-guaranteed.
The variable “change in unemployment” accounts for economic downturns. This
is relevant for public expenditure, revenue, and debt. If unemployment is rising
the government might want to stimulate the economy by increasing expenditure or
reducing tax rates. For debt, an increase in unemployment has a double effect: in
tandem with increase in expenditure the economic downturn might reduce govern-
ment revenue, generating additional debt. I use national unemployment instead of
state unemployment to avoid problems of endogeneity of the stimuli that can be
generated in the economy when there is an expansionary fiscal policy.
In somemodels I partition the data by tax and expenditure limitations (TEL). I use the
document published by the National Conference of State Legislatures (2012) which
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classifies each state as having a TEL or not. The document mentions that as of 2010,
30 states operate under a TEL. I coded this variable as dichotomous according to the
list published in the aforementioned document. It is important to note that by using
this variable I am making the strong assumption that all TELs have similar effects
across all states, and this is not true in general. All states have different legislation
that is implemented in different ways (McCubbins and McCubbins, 2013). A more
detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but can be found in Kiewiet
and Szakaly (1996) for debt, McCubbins and McCubbins (2013) for taxes, and, for
expenditure, Kousser et al. (2008).
Partisanship could also be relevant to determine the dynamics of public finance, and
if the governor has majority in the state legislature or not. In order to account for
this, I include the interaction of the political party of the governor by the control
of the legislature. Since Democrats are thought to be more liberal towards budget
decisions I expect the variable to be positively correlated with public expenditure,
taxes, and public debt. The status of having divided government or not was published
by Carl Klarner (2014). The value of this variable is one if all three institutions of
state government (i.e., the two chambers of the legislature and the governor’s office)
are not controlled by the same party.1
I also control for electoral competitiveness in the state. I expect governors in very
competitive states to have more incentive to increase public expenditure and debt
(and to reduce taxes) since any increase in electoral performance could have large
returns (this is winning or losing the election). I use the Holbrook van Dunk (HVD)
index. This index is available for almost all states and years in my sample, and it
1Klarner does not publish this variable for Nebraska, since its legislative power only re-
sides in one chamber, and senators are elected in a non partisan election. However I
coded this variable according to the biographies published in “The Blue Book” of Nebraska
(http://nebraskaccess.ne.gov/bluebookbios.asp) which has the biographies of all senators. These
biographies usually have the partisanship of each senator, allowing me to determine if there was a
divided government or not.
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is clean in the sense that it only uses electoral data (Holbrook 1993). The HVD
index has different versions depending on the number of years it averages. I use the
four-year HVD index since it is the shortest in the series, better reflecting the short
run competitiveness of the state. My source for this index is the database published
by Carl Klarner (2014).
In Figures 2.1-2.6 we can see that expenditure, revenue, and debt per capita have
been increasing in real terms during the period of interest for all analyzed states.
Expenditure increased from an average2 of 3,200 to 3,800, 4,800, and 6,500 in 1980,
1990, 2000, and 2010, respectively. Tax revenue increased from an average of 1,600
to 1,950, and 2,300 in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, but then did not increase
in real terms from 2000 to 2010. Debt has increased from 1,600, to 2,300, 2,500,
and 3,600 in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively.
( Figures 2.1-2.6 found at the end of this chapter)
Given the increasing trend in all our variables of interest, in order to perform a
better analysis it is necessary to work with first differences. Once we observe the
first differences of the variables of interest (Figures 2.2-2.6) we notice that the trend
is eliminated.
For this chapter, I only considered the states which for the whole sample had a
four-year gubernatorial electoral calendar. Therefore, I removed the states that had
(or still have) a two year calendar. These states are Arkansas, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and Vermont. I also removed Alaska from the sample since its public
finances are so different from the other states it would require a different type of
analysis. Given the 34 years of the sample, most states had eight to nine ordinary
gubernatorial elections in the studied period.
2In 2010 USD
16
2.5 Results
Public Expenditure
In Table 2.1 column (3), I estimate variations in public expenditure as a function
of the electoral calendar. I observe increases in public expenditure of 44 dollars
per capita in the pre-electoral year compared to the year immediate before it. This
pattern is consistent with the expected direction of the hypothesis. However, it
is also important to notice that we also observe an increase of 35 dollars in the
post-electoral year, which was not expected.
( Table 2.1 found at the end of this chapter)
This result is not new, the studies by Rose (2006) by Alt and Rose (2007) found
increases in expenditure during the pre-electoral year, but their sample corresponds
only to the first half of mine, and perhaps expenditure patterns have been changing
for most recent years. In order to test this, I divide my sample in half, and with
this estimate if there has been a transition between both periods. My estimates for
both subsamples can be found in Table 2.1 columns (1), and (2). At simple sight, it
appears that changes in expenditure as a function of the electoral calendar in both
periods might be different, but since several things in the estimation are changing,
such as coefficients, standard errors, and unobserved fixed effects, it is necessary
to test if these differences are indeed statistically significant. In order to do this, I
perform series of Chow tests.
For making the coefficients in both samples comparable, it is necessary to remove
the constant term (including fixed effects). This procedure would not be adequate if
the fixed effects in my model are substantially explaining the estimations. For this
reason I compare themodel with andwithout fixed effects (Table 2.1 columns (1,2,3)
against columns (4,5,6) and perform aHausman test. According to theHausman test,
17
for both subsamples, fixed and random effects model are indistinguishable (p = 0.61
and p=0.96 respectively). For the aggregate sample, fixed effects have explanatory
power (p= 0.00), but this difference is being driven by the change in the coefficient of
the control of Unified Government with Republican Governor. Without this control
both models using the full sample are indistinguishable (p=0.14).
Based on this, I pool both samples, remove the fixed affects (see Table 2.2 Column
1) and perform Chow test to see if the estimation of the political budget cycle has
changed. The first question that arises is how can we compare the magnitude of
the political budget cycle. It is easy to see that expenditure has been increasing
faster in all stages of the cycle during the second half of the sample by comparing
the coefficients for each period in Table 2.2. In all cases expenditure is increasing
faster for more recent years, and this difference is statistically significant (p<.02)
in all quarters. Therefore, the direct comparison of the political budget cycle
in expenditure is not appropriate. A better alternative is to see how expenditure
changes from one year to another within each of these groups. In order to perform
this comparison, I choose a year in the cycle and see how much other years change
with respect to it. For example, if we wanted to test if expenditure is larger in the
pre-electoral year compared to the year in the middle of the cycle in the first half of
the sample, the test to perform would be:
Election−1×SecondHal f−Election−2×SecondHal f = Election−1×FirstHal f−
Election−2 × FirstHal f
With this setup it is possible to test whether the budget cycle in expenditures changed
between both periods. The answer to this question usingmy sample is that it depends
on the reference year. I do not find statistically significant differences when the year
of reference is the year of the middle of the cycle (Election−2), or the post-electoral
year (Election+1). However, there is an important difference between both time
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periods regarding the change in expenditure from the pre-electoral to the electoral
year. I estimate the cycle to be larger and statistically significant in the earlier period
by $45 dollars per capita (p<.1).
( Table 2.2 found at the end of this chapter)
These differences are relevant in the sense that the political budget cycle was larger,
and easier to see in earlier years. For the most recent years, the political budget
cycle measured with expenditure is less evident.
Expenditure and Tax and Expenditure Limitations
As I mentioned before, it is important to incorporate the role of institutional restric-
tions on the liberty of public officials to adjust the public finances to gain political
favor. Several states have in place tax and expenditure limitations which, in princi-
ple, could prevent or at least limit the size of the political budget cycle. Therefore,
the natural question whether tax and expenditure limitations are indeed changing
the dynamics of expenditure arises.
( Table 2.3 found at the end of this chapter)
The approach I take to investigate whether this is the case or not is to follow a
similar strategy as for comparing the earlier and later parts of the sample. I estimate
changes of expenditure as a function of the electoral calendar independently for
the subsample of states which had a TEL, and for the ones that did not (See Table
2.3), and then estimate a model using the pooled sample (See Table 2.4, column
1) and do a Chow test comparing the coefficients of both. By visually inspecting
the estimations for states which have TELs and the ones that do not it is easy to
see that the budget cycle is similar for both groups. This suspicion is confirmed
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when I perform the Chow test to determine whether the differences are statistically
significant. It does not matter which year of the electoral cycle is picked as the
reference, all differences between both groups are not statistically significant. This
result is consistent with the aforementioned results in the literature that found TELs
are not accomplishing their objective of limiting expenditure.
Expenditure and Presidential Electoral Calendar
In this section I explore how the Presidential Electoral calendar influences the results
estimated above. This is an important verification since the presidential electoral
calendar is also every four years. Changes in federal budget and policy could be
well having an impact on the public finances of the states. As I did before, I split the
sample between states which their gubernatorial electoral calendar coincide with
the presidential one, and the ones which do not.
(Table 2.5 found at the end of this chapter)
Different from before, the sample sizes are very different. Only a handful states with
a four-year electoral calendar had gubernatorial elections at the same time of the
presidential one. These states are: Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, Montana, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Washington, and Utah. In Table 2.5, we can compare the
estimates between these two groups of states. In column (1) we have states in which
the gubernatorial elections coincide with the presidential election. In column (2)
all other states. At first glance it appears that the estimations for the political budget
cycle are smaller and do not reach statistical significance for the first group of states.
However, this is mainly derived from the smaller sample. This is confirmed when
I perform a Chow test to observe if the differences in both groups are statistically
significant or not. For this, consider the estimations in Table 2.6. It does not matter
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which year of the electoral cycle is chosen as the reference, all differences between
both groups are not statistically significant. Again, it is very difficult to conclude
that both groups of states are indeed equal in their expenditure cycle, since it is
difficult to make inference based on only a handful of states. Therefore, additional
data is necessary to confirm or reject this hypothesis.
( Table 2.6 found at the end of this chapter)
Expenditure and Other Controls
One natural question that arises when discussing different patterns of public finance
is partisanship. Again, the use of fixed effects in the estimations complicates the
identification of partisanship. If a state does not change the party of the governor
often, the fixed effect of that state is going to be prevalent over partisanship. For this
reason, it is more convenient to analyze the estimations in which fixed effects were
omitted from the analysis. The conclusion is that partisanship was correlated to
expenditure increases only in the first half of the sample (refer to Table 2.1 columns
1 and 2). For the second half of the sample, the difference in the average level of
expenditure increase is indistinguishable between both parties.
As for changes in national unemployment, they have a positive correlation with
expenditure. This estimation reaches statistical significance in allmodels and subsets
of the sample. In all cases, increases in national unemployment is associated with
increases in expenditure. In particular, this is similar for states that have a TEL
and states that do not. Looking at this result from another perspective, in principle
TELs could have the repercussion of limiting the incumbent office holding to adjust
spending for legitimate reasons such as downturns in the economy, but we do not
observe this is the case. Again, TELs are not reflected much on the expenditure
side.
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Expenditure Components
An interesting result regarding expenditure is when we analyze what components of
it are prone to fluctuate more as a function of the electoral calendar. In Table 2.7, I
show estimations for changes in different components of expenditure as a function
of the electoral calendar (using the full sample). Interestingly enough, expenditure
is not increasing because of the components we would expect when an election is
on the horizon. Expenditures in education, public welfare, and hospitals do not
fluctuate much when an election is coming. The change in total expenditure that we
observed earlier is mostly being driven by intergovernmental expenditure, which is
defined by the US Census Bureau (2016) as “Amounts paid to other governments
as fiscal aid in the form of shared revenues and grants-in-aid, as reimbursements
for performance of general government activities and for specific services for the
paying government, or in lieu of taxes. Exclude amounts paid to other governments
for purchase of commodities, property, or utility services, any tax imposed and paid
as such, and employer contributions for social insurance”.
( Table 2.7 found at the end of this chapter)
The reduction of the size of the expenditure cycle in recent years does not necessarily
imply that political budget cycles are decreasing in the United States. Perhaps what
is driving this is the increase party polarization, which results into ideological
heterogeneity. For example, some governors might benefit more for the increase
in expenditure, while others from reduction in taxes. These two types would both
generate a political budget cycle in the public finances, but only the first would be
evident using the traditional approach of looking at expenditures. For this reason it
is relevant to study revenue and debt as a function of the electoral calendar as well.
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Tax Revenue
In Table 2.8 I estimate how tax revenue fluctuates as a function of the electoral
calendar. Analogous to the analysis done for public expenditure, In column (1) I
perform this estimation for the first half of the sample, in column (2) for the second
half, and in column (3) for the full sample, always including fixed effects.
( Table 2.8 found at the end of this chapter)
Public revenue has not been studied much in its role in the political budget cycle. In
the first half of the sample (prior to 1994) we see that the decrease in public revenue
coming from taxes was observed in the year after the election (estimated reduction
of 31 dollars per capita), perhaps as a result of campaign promises. This does
not immediately help the incumbent governor in their reelection prospects since the
reduction in taxes was not prior to the election. However, for more recent years (after
1994), we see that the decrease in revenue from taxes is during the electoral year. I
estimate this decrease in 38 dollars per capita. As it was the case with expenditure,
several components of the estimation are changing, such as coefficients, standard
errors, and unobserved fixed effects. So in order to determine if the estimated
differences in the periods are statistically significant, I follow the same methodology
done with expenditure and perform a series of Chow tests. In Table 2.8 columns
(4), (5), and (6), remove the fixed effects to compare the estimates, and I perform
Hausman tests to see if random and fixed effects models are different among each
other. Coefficients indeed look very similar when working with and without fixed
effects, and the Hausman test cannot reject the null of both models being identical
for both subsamples.
Since both models are comparable, I remove the constant and fixed effects, and
calculate the pooled model to perform the Chow test. These estimates used for the
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Chow tests are show in Table 2.2 column (2). The Chow test indicates that there are
important differences between both periods. The cycle measured with tax revenue
is statistically significant larger in the second half of the sample when we measure
them in the decrease in tax revenue in the electoral year with respect to all other
years in the cycle.
Tax Revenue and Tax and Expenditure Limitations
In Table 2.9 I compare the estimations for the political budget cycle in tax revenue
when dividing the sample in states which have TEL and states that do not. As I
did before, I perform a Chow test to observe if changes in the political budget cycle
measured with tax revenue and dividing the sample by TEL produces statistically
significant differences.
( Table 2.9 found at the end of this chapter)
In this case, I estimate that tax revenue is decreasing during the electoral year only
in states which have TELs. For all other years of the electoral calendar we cannot
discard the hypothesis that tax revenue increases equally in states with TELS and
states without. Given this, my estimations suggest that the political budget cycle is
larger in states with TEL if we measure the change in Tax revenue from the electoral
year to the post-electoral year. Interpreting if Tax and Expenditure limitations are
fulfilling their objective of restricting tax growth is not straightforward. I estimate
they indeed they do during the electoral year, but not so in other years. It is hard
to image that the objective of a TEL would only focus on one year of the electoral
calendar.
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Tax Revenue and Presidential Elections
Analogous to the exercise performed for changes in expenditure, I make a partition
of the sample regarding possible differences in the political budget cycle measured
with tax revenue depending if the gubernatorial election calendar coincides with the
presidential (See Table 2.10). As before, we notice that the difference in sample
size is large since only eight states have concurrent elections with the presidential.
Given this, estimations for this group have sizable standard errors. Therefore, the
Chow tests to identify differences between these groups are almost always negative.
Only in one case there is a difference between groups: I find that for gubernatorial
post-electoral year, tax revenue is increasing faster in states which have concurrent
elections with the presidential. This finding is interesting in its own right, but does
not affect the finding of this paper regarding decreases in tax revenue during the
gubernatorial electoral year, and in any case would only attenuate its size. If non-
concurrent states would increase tax revenue at the same rate as concurrent states,
the relative decrease in revenue during the electoral year would be even larger.
( Table 2.10 found at the end of this chapter)
Tax Revenue and Other Controls
As for the relationship between tax revenue and unemployment, we can observe that
there is indeed a negative relationship: in all models and subsets of the sample,
increases in the national unemployment rate is associated with decreases in tax
revenue. In particular, for the full sample I estimate that an increase in 1% unem-
ployment rate in the country decreases tax revenue in $60 per capita. Partisanship
of the governor and having unified or divided government does not reach statistical
significance when estimating changes in tax revenue.
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Subsets of Tax Revenue
When considering only subsets of tax revenue (See Table 2.11), we can observe that
the decrease in electoral years are being driven by General Sales Tax and Individual
Income Tax. It is interesting to notice that these taxes are being paid directly by the
voters themselves, as opposed to taxes that are paid only by a reduced percentage of
the population such as license and corporate income taxes. This is consistent with
the hypothesis of an electoral motivation behind decreases in tax revenue during
electoral periods. I also estimate that all types of tax revenue decrease when national
unemployment increases.
( Table 2.11 found at the end of this chapter)
Public Debt
In Table 2.12 I show my estimations regarding how public debt fluctuates as a func-
tion of the electoral calendar. I follow the same procedure as for public expenditure
and tax revenue. In column (1) I show my estimates for the first half of the sample.
In column (2) for the second half, and in column (3) for the full sample, always
including state fixed effects.
( Table 2.12 found at the end of this chapter)
At first glance, comparison between both columns suggest that the dynamics of debt
has completely changed from the first half of the sample (1977-1994) to the second
half (1994-2011). During the first period there was no clear relationship between
debt and elections, but in the second one, we see that indeed debt increases much
more rapidly during the electoral year, compared to the year before and after the
election. In order to formally test these results I proceed to perform a series of Chow
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tests using both subsamples. For this, I remove the state fixed effects (the Hausman
test confirms that fixed effects and random effects models are indistinguishable)
and the constant and compare the estimations for both subsamples (See Table 2.2
column 3). The results of the Chow test confirm this. In the first half of the sample
there is no clear political budget cycle measured with public debt, but there is for
the second period. During the second half of the sample there is a larger increase
of public debt during electoral years compared to the post-electoral years, in line
with the hypothesis. I estimate this difference to be of 60 dollars per capita in the
second part of the sample. Another finding was that public debt is also increasing
more during the year of the middle of the cycle. This does not go in line with my
hypothesis, but a likely explanation of it is shown below when I discuss how the
introduction of the presidential electoral calendar into the estimation changes the
results.
These results are enlightening: we are finding a recurring and strong relationship
of having elections in the dynamics of public finance at the state level in the United
States when measured with debt. The current literature on political budget cycles
has focused on expenditure, but my results show that tax revenue and debt fluctuate
more in recent years. Debt is a much more sensitive indicator than expenditure since
it is robust to different causes of budgetary deficit, either increase in expenditure,
reduction in taxes, or both. This is helpful if we consider heterogeneity in states.
We expect that more liberal governments base their campaigns in generation of
employment and in providing more services to the population. Conservatives, on
the other hand, are in favor of a smaller government and reduction in taxes. When
we use public debt as an indicator, then both phenomena are reflected when we
estimate the cycle.
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Public Debt and TEL
In Table 2.13, I compare estimations for the political budget cycle measured with
public debt when dividing the sample in states which have TEL and states that do
not, and I perform a Chow test to identify differences between both. I estimate that
debt is increasing faster on states which have a TEL, and this is only the case during
the year in the middle of the electoral cycle. Therefore, there is no evidence that
TELs are restricting the increase in public debt, in any case it is the opposite.
Public Debt and Presidential Elections
In Table 2.14 we make different estimations for states which have gubernatorial
elections at the same time as the presidential election, and for all other states. As
mentioned before, since there are eight states in the sample that are in the first
category, standard errors for these estimations are rather large. As before, I also
performChow tests to be able to determine if the observed differences are statistically
significant.
For both groups debt increases faster in the electoral year compared to the post-
electoral year. However, there is also an important difference. Even when con-
sidering the large standard errors for the first group, I estimate that debt increases
faster in the pre-electoral year; meanwhile for the non-concurrent group it increases
faster in the post-electoral year. What this implies is that debt is increasing faster
for both groups of states when there is a presidential election on the horizon. So
the conclusion for this exercise is that the increase in debt during the gubernatorial
electoral year is robust to having a presidential election, but other increases in debt
are not independent from the presidential electoral calendar.
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2.6 Conclusion
My analysis of expenditure, revenue, and debt at the state level in the US shows that
the political budget cycle has transitioned in its form over time. Indeed, for earlier
years (1977-2011), the cycle was observed mainly on expenditures. Meanwhile,
during recent years (1994-2011), I do find a sizable political budget cycle measured
with revenue and debt. Whenwe use tax revenue and debt instead of expenditure, the
estimation of the cycle is clearer, larger and more robust to different specifications
of the model.
I also incorporate the role of Tax and Expenditure limitations and I found that in
general there is no significant statistical difference between the states that have these
limitations and those that do not in different indicators of public finance. This result
is consistent with the majority of the literature in this topic. My results are also
robust to the incorporation of the presidential electoral calendar, although it is an
important determinant of state public finance.
With these findings I propose reexamining the current status of the literature re-
garding political budget cycles in different countries and levels of government. By
only considering expenditure, the current literature could be well underestimating
the real size of the cycle.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Estimations - Changes in Total Expenditure by Period
Dependent variable:
∆ Expenditure PC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 44.957∗∗∗ 33.718∗ 43.902∗∗∗ 43.713∗∗∗ 33.053∗ 43.128∗∗∗
(16.692) (19.796) (13.015) (15.948) (19.819) (12.967)
Election 4.901 37.398∗ 18.413 2.677 38.393∗ 17.386
(15.786) (19.667) (12.629) (15.127) (19.690) (12.555)
Election + 1 24.711 44.510∗∗ 35.689∗∗∗ 22.547 43.516∗∗ 35.140∗∗∗
(16.250) (19.112) (12.636) (15.750) (19.112) (12.559)
∆ Unemployment 12.286∗∗ 43.781∗∗∗ 32.876∗∗∗ 13.266∗∗ 45.599∗∗∗ 33.259∗∗∗
(6.015) (7.019) (4.595) (5.984) (7.002) (4.610)
Divided + Democrat 16.708 16.038 20.172 7.857 22.059 17.331
(22.325) (24.933) (14.419) (12.564) (18.180) (11.470)
Unified + Democrat −11.983 64.641∗∗∗ 16.352 2.399 41.645∗∗ 9.570
(17.310) (23.685) (12.961) (11.819) (19.679) (11.321)
Unified + Republican −13.091 −51.594∗ 3.068 −16.318 −20.194 −9.298
(32.839) (28.360) (16.706) (19.354) (17.217) (12.336)
∆ Competitiveness 1.814 −2.451 −0.371 0.114 −2.918 −1.848
(3.339) (3.500) (2.415) (3.134) (3.432) (2.387)
Constant 46.397∗∗∗ 83.284∗∗∗ 65.082∗∗∗
(11.766) (17.235) (10.515)
Years 1977-1994 1995-2011 1977-2011 1977-1994 1995-2011 1977-2011
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 765 765 1,530 765 765 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.086 0.046 0.021 0.080 0.047
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.2: Estimations for Chow Test for Differences Between Periods
Dependent variable:
∆ Expenditure PC ∆TaxesPC ∆DebtPC
(1) (2) (3)
Election − 1 × Late 129.306∗∗∗ 47.900∗∗∗ 30.012
(14.316) (10.354) (20.465)
Election × Late 128.148∗∗∗ 9.081 111.499∗∗∗
(14.117) (10.211) (20.192)
Election + 1 × Late 130.648∗∗∗ 28.941∗∗∗ 53.460∗∗∗
(13.558) (9.831) (19.519)
Election + 2 × Late 90.000∗∗∗ 47.143∗∗∗ 105.037∗∗∗
(14.268) (10.322) (20.412)
Election − 1 × Early 81.652∗∗∗ 20.099∗ 43.924∗∗
(14.656) (10.586) (20.872)
Election × Early 36.574∗∗∗ 33.956∗∗∗ 52.595∗∗∗
(13.548) (9.803) (19.387)
Election + 1 × Early 59.559∗∗∗ −2.209 40.944∗∗
(14.287) (10.315) (20.324)
Election + 2× Early 34.743∗∗ 29.823∗∗∗ 15.211
(14.367) (10.371) (20.429)
∆ Unemployment 29.563∗∗∗ −62.040∗∗∗ −2.438
(4.586) (3.278) (6.341)
Divided + Democrat 22.805∗∗ −2.278 19.053
(11.190) (8.233) (16.637)
Unified + Democrat 22.518∗∗ 4.034 4.617
(11.021) (8.038) (16.002)
Unified + Republican −21.466∗ 5.430 −16.929
(12.503) (9.283) (19.045)
∆ Competitiveness −2.100 2.346 −1.010
(2.357) (1.689) (3.277)
Years 1977-2011 1977-2011 1977-2011
State FE N N N
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.196 0.011
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.3: Estimations - Changes in Total Expenditure by TEL
Dependent variable:
∆ Expenditure PC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 50.124∗∗ 37.233∗∗ 43.902∗∗∗ 49.451∗∗ 40.251∗∗ 43.128∗∗∗
(22.624) (15.867) (13.015) (22.582) (15.731) (12.967)
Election 22.775 19.415 18.413 22.068 16.276 17.386
(22.463) (15.226) (12.629) (22.361) (15.017) (12.555)
Election + 1 33.036 36.304∗∗ 35.689∗∗∗ 29.022 37.556∗∗ 35.140∗∗∗
(22.182) (15.288) (12.636) (22.074) (15.148) (12.559)
∆ Unemployment 35.488∗∗∗ 29.587∗∗∗ 32.876∗∗∗ 35.235∗∗∗ 31.192∗∗∗ 33.259∗∗∗
(8.062) (5.630) (4.595) (8.016) (5.609) (4.610)
Divided + Democrat 30.890 24.722 20.172 −5.609 21.211 17.331
(25.763) (18.483) (14.419) (17.405) (14.575) (11.470)
Unified + Democrat 74.550∗∗∗ −8.449 16.352 35.191∗ −9.579 9.570
(23.913) (16.424) (12.961) (18.312) (13.922) (11.321)
Unified + Republican 3.209 3.525 3.068 −4.712 −8.046 −9.298
(28.805) (21.887) (16.706) (17.303) (16.595) (12.336)
∆ Competitiveness 1.221 −2.783 −0.371 1.235 −3.325 −1.848
(3.763) (3.275) (2.415) (3.660) (3.174) (2.387)
Constant 57.395∗∗∗ 70.907∗∗∗ 65.082∗∗∗
(16.771) (13.226) (10.515)
TEL Y N Both Y N Both
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 577 953 1,530 577 953 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.063 0.042 0.046 0.059 0.054 0.047
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.4: Estimations for Chow Test for Differences Between TEL
Dependent variable:
∆ Expenditure PC ∆TaxesPC ∆DebtPC
(1) (2) (3)
Election − 1 ×TEL 104.611∗∗∗ 21.570∗ 23.642
(15.358) (11.039) (22.418)
Election × TEL 76.696∗∗∗ 3.963 90.289∗∗∗
(15.228) (10.947) (22.235)
Election + 1 × TEL 87.129∗∗∗ 20.914∗ 49.702∗∗
(14.967) (10.778) (21.964)
Election + 2 × TEL 51.000∗∗∗ 35.727∗∗∗ 93.950∗∗∗
(15.535) (11.157) (22.619)
Election − 1 × NO TEL 107.026∗∗∗ 42.002∗∗∗ 42.306∗∗
(13.122) (9.453) (19.273)
Election × NO TEL 81.587∗∗∗ 31.118∗∗∗ 72.972∗∗∗
(12.368) (8.923) (18.234)
Election + 1 × NO TEL 103.913∗∗∗ 9.612 43.652∗∗
(12.472) (9.003) (18.426)
Election + 2× NO TEL 70.093∗∗∗ 39.417∗∗∗ 38.380∗∗
(12.898) (9.289) (18.930)
∆ Unemployment 31.857∗∗∗ −60.674∗∗∗ −1.828
(4.648) (3.267) (6.303)
Divided + Democrat 23.530∗∗ −0.128 21.626
(10.721) (7.932) (16.654)
Unified + Democrat 14.130 1.786 0.981
(10.745) (7.844) (16.025)
Unified + Republican −5.500 9.619 −5.784
(11.551) (8.641) (18.534)
∆ Competitiveness −2.597 1.951 −1.180
(2.396) (1.692) (3.284)
TEL Both Both Both
FE N N N
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.190 0.004
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.5: Estimations - Changes in Total Expenditure by Concurrent with Presi-
dential
Dependent variable:
∆ Expenditure PC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 27.154 47.722∗∗∗ 43.902∗∗∗ 27.505 47.229∗∗∗ 43.128∗∗∗
(28.631) (14.667) (13.015) (28.309) (14.720) (12.967)
Election −0.338 23.495∗ 18.413 −0.847 22.880 17.386
(28.512) (14.174) (12.629) (28.191) (14.222) (12.555)
Election + 1 26.783 40.666∗∗∗ 35.689∗∗∗ 26.529 40.507∗∗∗ 35.140∗∗∗
(28.773) (14.197) (12.636) (28.467) (14.240) (12.559)
∆ Unemployment 21.127∗ 35.632∗∗∗ 32.876∗∗∗ 21.373∗∗ 35.964∗∗∗ 33.259∗∗∗
(10.752) (5.130) (4.595) (10.643) (5.150) (4.610)
Divided + Democrat 4.986 26.071 20.172 −0.019 22.768∗ 17.331
(30.872) (16.568) (14.419) (29.769) (12.929) (11.470)
Unified + Democrat −11.192 19.244 16.352 −16.270 14.823 9.570
(37.261) (13.890) (12.961) (35.015) (12.189) (11.321)
Unified + Republican 33.655 −5.658 3.068 20.004 −16.859 −9.298
(37.322) (18.771) (16.706) (33.113) (14.312) (12.336)
∆ Competitiveness −2.712 0.088 −0.371 −2.869 −1.527 −1.848
(6.046) (2.646) (2.415) (5.975) (2.613) (2.387)
Constant 78.747∗∗∗ 59.224∗∗∗ 65.082∗∗∗
(28.360) (11.909) (10.515)
Coincides Presidential Y N Both Y N Both
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 272 1,258 1,530 272 1,258 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.053 0.046 0.028 0.055 0.047
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Estimations for Chow Test for differences in Presidential Elections
Dependent variable:
∆ Expenditure PC ∆TaxesPC ∆DebtPC
(1) (2) (3)
Election − 1 × Non-Concurrent 105.762∗∗∗ 30.495∗∗∗ 22.797
(11.722) (8.425) (16.848)
Election × Non-Concurrent 80.600∗∗∗ 19.301∗∗ 82.545∗∗∗
(11.201) (8.065) (16.172)
Election + 1 ×Non-Concurrent 96.563∗∗∗ 14.566∗ 56.708∗∗∗
(11.257) (8.108) (16.267)
Election + 2 × Non-Concurrent 56.192∗∗∗ 37.915∗∗∗ 59.461∗∗∗
(11.558) (8.309) (16.625)
Election − 1 × Concurrent 103.783∗∗∗ 60.583∗∗∗ 95.427∗∗∗
(24.170) (17.339) (34.537)
Election × Concurrent 71.785∗∗∗ 42.273∗∗ 60.299∗
(23.809) (17.091) (34.082)
Election + 1 × Concurrent 98.261∗∗∗ 20.819 −14.146
(23.838) (17.110) (34.117)
Election + 2× Concurrent 92.685∗∗∗ 46.562∗∗∗ 61.332∗
(24.170) (17.336) (34.529)
∆ Unemployment 31.316∗∗∗ −60.930∗∗∗ 0.184
(4.650) (3.279) (6.341)
Divided + Democrat 22.989∗∗ −4.057 21.072
(11.536) (8.372) (16.831)
Unified + Democrat 15.919 3.027 0.045
(11.157) (8.038) (15.981)
Unified + Republican −4.848 5.944 −4.492
(12.631) (9.240) (18.789)
∆ Competitiveness −2.183 1.998 −1.193
(2.392) (1.691) (3.279)
Concurrent Presidential Both Both Both
State FE N N N
Observations 1,530 1,530 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.190 0.006
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.8: Estimations - Changes in Tax Revenue by Period
Dependent variable:
∆TaxesPC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −6.976 10.558 1.806 −7.290 10.681 0.108
(11.385) (14.154) (9.238) (10.624) (14.184) (9.196)
Election 3.336 −38.103∗∗∗ −10.398 2.261 −37.931∗∗∗ −12.311
(10.767) (14.061) (8.963) (10.085) (14.092) (8.907)
Election + 1 −31.076∗∗∗ −20.780 −17.910∗∗ −30.475∗∗∗ −21.779 −19.510∗∗
(11.084) (13.665) (8.969) (10.579) (13.682) (8.909)
∆ Unemployment −34.750∗∗∗ −89.149∗∗∗ −60.317∗∗∗ −33.755∗∗∗ −88.300∗∗∗ −60.099∗∗∗
(4.103) (5.018) (3.261) (4.087) (5.014) (3.266)
Divided + Democrat −22.505 11.283 −6.292 −2.768 8.858 −1.148
(15.227) (17.827) (10.233) (7.156) (14.043) (8.333)
Unified + Democrat 7.519 24.970 7.040 8.802 16.171 2.837
(11.807) (16.934) (9.199) (6.931) (14.846) (8.166)
Unified + Republican 4.351 −11.683 8.575 −1.784 5.434 9.616
(22.399) (20.276) (11.857) (11.025) (13.744) (9.025)
∆ Competitiveness 3.742 2.151 3.055∗ 1.069 1.429 2.207
(2.277) (2.502) (1.714) (2.067) (2.472) (1.695)
Constant 28.031∗∗∗ 44.735∗∗∗ 33.595∗∗∗
(7.266) (13.105) (7.578)
Years 1977-1994 1995-2011 1977-2011 1977-1994 1995-2011 1977-2011
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 765 765 1,530 765 765 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.292 0.186 0.102 0.294 0.185
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.9: Estimations - Changes in Tax Revenue by TEL
Dependent variable:
∆TaxesPC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −3.176 4.258 1.806 −3.107 1.034 0.108
(13.175) (12.538) (9.238) (13.080) (12.441) (9.196)
Election −25.272∗ −2.763 −10.398 −24.611∗ −8.085 −12.311
(13.081) (12.032) (8.963) (12.941) (11.867) (8.907)
Election + 1 −10.272 −24.479∗∗ −17.910∗∗ −11.391 −28.762∗∗ −19.510∗∗
(12.918) (12.080) (8.969) (12.778) (11.968) (8.909)
∆ Unemployment −82.855∗∗∗ −46.974∗∗∗ −60.317∗∗∗ −81.769∗∗∗ −46.501∗∗∗ −60.099∗∗∗
(4.695) (4.449) (3.261) (4.650) (4.454) (3.266)
Divided + Democrat −7.576 −7.808 −6.292 −13.242 9.963 −1.148
(15.003) (14.605) (10.233) (9.337) (10.107) (8.333)
Unified + Democrat 6.390 7.205 7.040 3.532 1.222 2.837
(13.926) (12.978) (9.199) (9.887) (9.752) (8.166)
Unified + Republican −18.145 24.663 8.575 −12.746 27.736∗∗ 9.616
(16.774) (17.295) (11.857) (9.386) (10.873) (9.025)
∆ Competitiveness 3.075 2.797 3.055∗ 2.035 1.375 2.207
(2.191) (2.588) (1.714) (2.109) (2.469) (1.695)
Constant 36.636∗∗∗ 32.587∗∗∗ 33.595∗∗∗
(9.430) (9.571) (7.578)
TEL Y N Both Y N Both
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 577 953 1,530 577 953 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.352 0.112 0.186 0.358 0.117 0.185
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.10: Estimations - Changes in Tax Revenue by Concurrent with Presidential
Dependent variable:
∆TaxesPC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 37.024 −7.251 1.806 36.544 −7.660 0.108
(24.481) (9.929) (9.238) (24.270) (9.956) (9.196)
Election 20.526 −18.583∗ −10.398 19.626 −19.048∗∗ −12.311
(24.379) (9.596) (8.963) (24.171) (9.619) (8.907)
Election + 1 −3.877 −22.732∗∗ −17.910∗∗ −4.659 −22.413∗∗ −19.510∗∗
(24.602) (9.611) (8.969) (24.401) (9.629) (8.909)
∆ Unemployment −58.285∗∗∗ −60.571∗∗∗ −60.317∗∗∗ −58.122∗∗∗ −60.267∗∗∗ −60.099∗∗∗
(9.193) (3.473) (3.261) (9.121) (3.484) (3.266)
Divided + Democrat −35.507 2.146 −6.292 −35.499 5.834 −1.148
(26.397) (11.217) (10.233) (25.805) (7.926) (8.333)
Unified + Democrat −15.501 9.497 7.040 −18.039 4.863 2.837
(31.860) (9.403) (9.199) (30.709) (7.696) (8.166)
Unified + Republican 24.944 0.598 8.575 24.550 −4.600 9.616
(31.912) (12.708) (11.857) (29.742) (8.694) (9.025)
∆ Competitiveness 1.727 2.935 3.055∗ 1.526 1.359 2.207
(5.170) (1.791) (1.714) (5.124) (1.749) (1.695)
Constant 33.935 36.589∗∗∗ 33.595∗∗∗
(27.343) (7.696) (7.578)
Coincides Presidential Y N N Y N N
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 272 1,258 1,530 272 1,258 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.199 0.186 0.164 0.199 0.185
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.12: Estimations - Changes in Public Debt by Period
Dependent variable:
∆DebtPC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 8.294 −78.653∗∗∗ −35.776∗∗ −0.439 −79.472∗∗∗ −36.797∗∗
(24.678) (26.297) (17.784) (23.940) (26.269) (17.709)
Election 18.246 6.158 9.450 10.312 5.647 8.173
(23.339) (26.125) (17.256) (22.693) (26.099) (17.163)
Election + 1 2.596 −48.810∗ −23.663 −3.536 −49.519∗ −24.937
(24.025) (25.389) (17.267) (23.526) (25.333) (17.168)
∆ Unemployment −12.641 9.096 −0.267 −12.681 9.459 −0.080
(8.893) (9.324) (6.279) (8.848) (9.281) (6.279)
Divided + Democrat 5.290 10.722 10.715 8.209 −8.789 3.751
(33.007) (33.121) (19.702) (21.493) (24.189) (16.806)
Unified + Democrat −4.416 −8.323 −11.321 −22.829 −3.756 −16.884
(25.592) (31.463) (17.710) (19.588) (26.154) (16.215)
Unified + Republican 3.498 −48.679 −22.552 13.589 −42.252∗ −20.008
(48.551) (37.673) (22.827) (33.017) (22.941) (18.463)
∆ Competitiveness −2.895 3.948 0.285 −3.438 1.751 −0.550
(4.936) (4.649) (3.300) (4.735) (4.551) (3.271)
Constant 54.066∗∗∗ 120.348∗∗∗ 83.325∗∗∗
(19.012) (22.904) (15.157)
Years 1977-1994 1995-2011 1977-2011 1977-1994 1995-2011 1977-2011
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 765 765 1,530 765 765 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.025 0.007 0.008 0.026 0.007
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.13: Estimations - Changes in Public Debt by TEL
Dependent variable:
∆DebtPC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −82.422∗∗∗ −8.573 −35.776∗∗ −83.584∗∗∗ −8.949 −36.797∗∗
(28.439) (22.839) (17.784) (28.284) (22.487) (17.709)
Election −10.370 20.682 9.450 −12.145 21.516 8.173
(28.236) (21.915) (17.256) (28.072) (21.457) (17.163)
Election + 1 −43.776 −12.235 −23.663 −45.952∗ −9.740 −24.937
(27.884) (22.004) (17.267) (27.708) (21.641) (17.168)
∆ Unemployment 21.327∗∗ −14.095∗ −0.267 21.304∗∗ −12.883 −0.080
(10.135) (8.104) (6.279) (10.034) (8.039) (6.279)
Divided + Democrat 32.876 12.814 10.715 25.777 −4.671 3.751
(32.385) (26.604) (19.702) (29.311) (19.058) (16.806)
Unified + Democrat −8.990 −17.502 −11.321 −14.084 −16.733 −16.884
(30.060) (23.639) (17.710) (28.294) (18.371) (16.215)
Unified + Republican −36.109 −4.427 −22.552 −36.006 −4.494 −20.008
(36.209) (31.502) (22.827) (31.277) (20.877) (18.463)
∆ Competitiveness −0.576 0.576 0.285 −0.169 −2.034 −0.550
(4.730) (4.714) (3.300) (4.670) (4.489) (3.271)
Constant 111.993∗∗∗ 63.286∗∗∗ 83.325∗∗∗
(27.435) (17.737) (15.157)
TEL Y N Both Y N Both
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 577 953 1,530 577 953 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.030 0.007 0.007 0.033 0.006 0.007
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.14: Estimations - Changes in Public Debt by Concurrent with Presidential
Dependent variable:
∆DebtPC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 5.071 −38.173∗∗ −35.776∗∗ 3.016 −38.081∗∗ −36.797∗∗
(51.679) (18.453) (17.784) (51.009) (18.456) (17.709)
Election −38.992 21.419 9.450 −40.305 21.247 8.173
(51.464) (17.833) (17.256) (50.793) (17.834) (17.163)
Election + 1 −119.263∗∗ −5.582 −23.663 −120.327∗∗ −5.506 −24.937
(51.936) (17.862) (17.267) (51.297) (17.860) (17.168)
∆ Unemployment 31.932 −3.584 −0.267 31.813∗ −3.431 −0.080
(19.407) (6.455) (6.279) (19.180) (6.456) (6.279)
Divided + Democrat −39.376 19.808 10.715 −29.655 7.660 3.751
(55.725) (20.846) (19.702) (53.385) (18.123) (16.806)
Unified + Democrat −53.888 −7.043 −11.321 −57.297 −11.129 −16.884
(67.257) (17.476) (17.710) (62.472) (16.344) (16.215)
Unified + Republican −85.722 −9.891 −22.552 −62.853 −15.014 −20.008
(67.368) (23.617) (22.827) (58.523) (20.276) (18.463)
∆ Competitiveness −15.015 2.597 0.285 −14.955 1.884 −0.550
(10.913) (3.329) (3.300) (10.764) (3.305) (3.271)
Constant 141.109∗∗∗ 70.195∗∗∗ 83.325∗∗∗
(49.618) (16.261) (15.157)
Coincides Presidential Y N N Y N N
State FE Y Y Y N N N
Observations 272 1,258 1,530 272 1,258 1,530
Adjusted R2 0.040 0.011 0.007 0.040 0.011 0.007
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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C h a p t e r 3
POLITICAL PENSION CONTRIBUTION CYCLES: EVIDENCE
FROM US STATES
3.1 Abstract
I extend the literature of political budget cycles at the subnational level to include
pension funding. I explore the relationship between state pension funding and
gubernatorial elections in the United States for the years 2001-2014. I show that it is
more likely to observe undercontributions to pension funds during the pre-electoral
year. I also found changes in the percentage of the pension funds invested in equity
as a function of the electoral calendar, where decisions to invest inmore conservative
assets (i.e. bonds) are made in non-electoral years.
3.2 Introduction
“At the bottom of it all is a political culture that rewarded politicians who made
unsustainable promises (...) People enjoy the pleasure of getting stuff without the pain
of paying for it and there is always a strong temptation in state and local government
to imbalance spending and taxation and use the pension fund to hide debt. The bill
doesn’t come due until well after the legislators whowrote the check have left office...”
-The Providence Journal (2011), as quoted by McGuinn (2014)
Subnational public pension sustainability in the US is a highly discussed and fairly
controversial issue. While Munell (2012) argues that not all state and local systems
are in a critical situation, the estimated aggregated unfunded liabilities in 2014
accrued to roughly $1.1 trillion, while total projected liabilities amount up to $4.3
trillion (Munell and Aubry, 2015). Kiewiet and McCubbins (2014) detail the
problem further: there are now close to nine million people receiving retirement
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benefits from state and local government employers, and this number will double by
2030.
Calculating pension underfunding is difficult. It requires incorporating many vari-
ables and making several important assumptions. As Kiewiet (2010) summarizes,
in order to calculate underfunding we need to know (1) how many covered employ-
ees are going to be retiring over time; (2) the cost of the benefits they have been
promised; (3) how long they and their covered dependents are going to live; (4)
the amount of money that is going to be contributed into the fund by current and
future employees, and (5) the fund’s return on investment of assets. Despite these
difficulties most estimates agree that this is a sizable problem. As Brown, Clark,
and Rauh (2011) put it, “Although there is disagreement between economists and
plan administrators on the size of the unfunded liabilities, everyone agrees that state
and local pensions in the US have assets that are substantially below the present
value of the promises that have been made to public sector workers and retirees”.
The problem is particularly egregious given the fact that these workers have already
fulfilled their obligations and are now in a vulnerable position (Kiewiet, 2010).
Despite the magnitude of the problem, its full consequences will be felt most acutely
in the future. The decision of repudiating pension-related liabilities due to financial
constraints will most likely be faced by future generations. As stated by Thom
and Randazzo (2015), “even pension funds with significant unfunded liabilities are
rarely at risk of defaulting on benefit payments in the short term”. Actions should
be taken now to identify sources of further deterioration of state and local pensions’
sustainability and prevent them, since we are still allegedly far away from defaulting
on these benefit payments.
Several efforts to explain pension underfunding have already been done. One area
of research involves studying how fiscal stress contributes to pension underfunding.
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Mitchell and Smith (1994) find that fiscal pressure appears to cause some public
employers to reduce their annual contributions below the required level. Eaton
and Nosfinger (2004) find that when government sponsors of public pension plans
experience tight fiscal constraints, they manipulate the plans’ actuarial assumptions
to lower their required contribution; additionally, they find these plans have a greater
propensity for underfunding than plans from less fiscally constrained states. Thom
(2013) also finds a negative relationship between pension funding and outstanding
state debt. The complete opposite conclusion is reached by Triest and Zhao (2013),
who find that plan sponsors do not reduce their contributions in response to negative
fiscal or economic shocks.
Another area of research relates to issues with workers’ demographic forecasting
and accounting standards. Mitchell and Smith (1994) indicate that in the late 1980s
there were no instances of egregious misuse of actuarial and economic assumptions
for the purpose of reducing employers’ pension fund contributions. Meanwhile,
using CalPERS1 as an example, Sabin (2015) found that employees retired earlier
than expected, wages increased faster, and people lived longer, which led the State
of California to greatly underestimate the accurate contributions.
Another relevant subject is the government level in charge of pension fund adminis-
tration, as discussed byMunell and Aubry (2015), who found that state administered
plans are not only bigger with respect to local systems (they receive 58% of sponsor
pension contributions), but also have a better administration, since despite having
smaller payments with respect to their funding needs, their asset levels have higher
returns.
The relationship between labor unions and pension funding has also been studied.
Mitchell and Smith (1994) show that growth in employee unionization reduces the
rate at which public sector employers actually contribute what they are required each
1California Public Employees’ Retirement System
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year. Kiewiet (2010) finds that the strength of labor unions is associated with higher
wages, but not so with public pension underfunding. Recently, Frandsen (2016) and
Frandsen and Webb (2017) analyzed the effect of organized union power, finding
that collective bargaining rights resulted in higher benefits for public employees,
which vary according to the type of job performed, and in turn generated bigger
contributions towards pension plans.
Partisanship and its role in the funding of state pensions has also been explored, but
withmixed conclusions. Anzia andMoe (2013) find that, during favorable economic
times, state legislatures tended to increase the generosity of public pensions, and
voting patterns were heavily bipartisan, but, after the recession, union financial
support and legislator conservatism (both correlated with partisanship) became
stronger predictors of pension votes. Elder and Wagner (2015) argue that partisan
polarization and electoral uncertainty lead to greater underfunding. Thom (2013)
finds a significant relationship between pension funding and legislative partisanship
and citizen ideology. Partisanship has also been related to pension reform. Thom
(2013) finds that Republican legislative, but not executive, partisanship is a strong
predictor of pension reform.
Until my contribution, the electoral cycle has been conspicuously absent from these
conversations even though it has been proven to be a determinant for local govern-
ments’ spending patterns (Rose, 2006). My analysis contributes to several areas of
research in the current literature. The main contribution is to relate pensions to the
subnational budget shocks caused by electoral cycles. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first time an empirical study shows pension-related adjustments being
motivated by the political cycle.
Regarding political budget cycles at the state and local level in the US, there is
evidence that during election years states’ public finances change as a function of
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the electoral calendar. Melchior et al. (1993) analyzed the local level in urban
areas for the period 1978-1985 and found that there was a disproportionate tendency
for mayor-councils to have the lowest tax increase in the fiscal year of an election.
Alt and Rose (2007) investigated factors which are associated with an increase in
expenditure in electoral periods. State public finance forecasts are also affected by
the electoral calendar, as argued by Boylan (2008), who measured higher deficit in
those periods. There were no relevant effects on forecasted deficits, which means
that they undergo midyear tax increase or expenditure cuts. It should be noted that
the measure of debt of the political budget cycles is usually based on cash flow
instead of accrual accounting (Irwin, 2015). This could contribute to the apparent
lack of effect on deficits forecast. However, observing the underpayment of pension
funds goes one step towards the accrual accounting of political budget cycles.
One argument against the short-term use of budget dynamics for electoral purposes is
the negative impact it could have on citizens, who in turn would penalize this course
of action. While local fiscal multipliers are low and not statistically significant,
as shown by Clemens and Miran (2012), using the upper bound on the range
of estimates, behaviors such as pro-ciclicality in expenditures could account for
roughly 4% of state-level income variation, which is not negligible. Therefore, a
state administration affected by this kind of electoral-induced distortion in public
spending would like to reduce the immediate negative impact on voters’ welfare.
State contributions to local public pensions are an “ideal” expense to be cut in such an
environment. Splinter (2017) concludes that states cut their pension contributions
eight times more than other spending in response to fiscal stress. This relevant
reduction is derived from the fact that voters usually underestimate the long-term
impact of a poor pension system and place more value on the benefits derived from
increased public expenditures with immediate impact.
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I connect these branches of the literature by showing that electoral fiscal stress is
translated in reductions to pension contributions. Voter shortsightedness regarding
pension liabilities could not only be derived from impatience, but also from the fact
that the impacts of such contingencies are hard to measure. As I mentioned before,
actuarial studies depend on a series of variables, both current and forecasted, which
include demographic information about employees, wages, and pension financial
asset returns, among other factors.
In addition to regular issues with pension liability valuation, qualitative studies show
that it is not uncommon for state governments to take actions that change the main
parameters in ways to contribute less (or exaggerate financial sustainability). Mina-
han (2014) talks about “social opacity” in social security liability valuation, stating
that “in the public pension world, red herrings play a central role in preventing open
communication”, to the extent that when the author “raise[d] the topic of economic
value of liabilities to a plan sponsor or actuary, and even some investment profes-
sionals, he would encounter these responses as ways of dismissing the relevance
of economics to pension liability valuation”. Such conduct was also documented
through a panel analysis by Eaton and Nofsinger (2004), who expose that when
states experience tight fiscal constraints, they manipulate the plans’ actuarial as-
sumptions to lower their required contribution. My investigation also contributes
to the literature by providing empirical support of this practical use of valuation
parameters to reduce political budget cycle stress.
While investment decisions about pension funds are usually taken by a board of
trustees, this body is not free of political pressures or conflicts of interest, as docu-
mented by Dobra and Lubich (2013). They provide evidence showing that pension
board composition, in addition to influencing asset allocation, may also have an
effect on portfolio risk; investment decisions vary depending on whether the board
consists of active, retired, or ex-officio members. In principle, these types of port-
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folio allocation decisions could also be related to the political calendar. Eaton and
Nosfinger (2004) find further evidence that plans subject to political pressure are also
more likely to have optimistic accounting assumptions and to be more underfunded
than those plans not facing political pressure.
Most retirement systems have guidelines that regulate the allocation of investment
in diverse types of assets such as equity (international and domestic), bonds and real
estate, to name just a few. I reviewed the investment policies of the seven biggest
retirement systems (California Public Employees’ Retirement System [CalPERS],
California State Teachers’ Retirement System [CalSTRS], Florida Retirement Sys-
tem [FRS], Teacher Retirement System of Texas [TRS], New York State Teacher’s
Retirement System [NYSTRS], School Employees’ Retirement System of Ohio
[OHSERS], and Ohio Public Employees Retirement System [OPERS]), and found
that the potential share of the overall investment allotted in equity ranges between
45% to 65%, which gives a great deal of freedom to allocate resources, should it be
needed. The investment portfolio allocations of the aforementioned pension system
can be found starting on Table 3.9.
Furthermore, even with the assistance of investment advisors and experts, operating
within different system-specific investment guidelines, there is room for biased
selection of asset allocation: all reviewed policies coincide in the fact that the board
of trustees have the ultimate decision on where to invest the assets. Members of
a retirement system’s board usually represent workers, retirees, the governor, and
some offices of the three branches of local government. Clearly, an administration
that wants to manipulate the expected required contribution by changing investment
return expectations can do so through their influence with the board. This is easily
attainable in a case such as Texas TRS, where all the board members are ultimately
appointed by the governor. While there are cases where the local executive is less
represented as in OPERS, where only 1 member is appointed by the governor, there
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is certainly room for influence nonetheless. For a more detailed discussion on the
subject of the political dynamics within boards of trustees, view Dobra and Lubich
(2013).
3.3 Hypotheses and Model
In this chapter, I focus on two factors regarding pension funding. The first is
the percentage of the Annual Required Contribution (ARC),2 paid by employers
and the state government. My first hypothesis is the following: 1) I expect an
undercontribution to pension funds during pre-electoral years. This hypothesis
follows the same logic of increasing public debt during the pre-electoral year: it
is costly to increase revenue to fund pensions during electoral years as well as
making budgetary adjustments. The second hypothesis is related to the distortion in
contingent liabilities valuation through increases in asset returns (thus it also deals
with how the ARC is calculated in first place): the percentage of the fund assets
that are invested in equity. In general, returns from equity are assumed to be higher
than returns from safer assets such as bonds. From this, and the studies detailed
in the past section, I deduce my second hypothesis. 2) It is more likely to observe
increases in the percentage of the fund invested in equity during pre-electoral years.
Analogously, if there is a decision to reduce the percentage of the fund invested in
equity, it would be done so during non-electoral years.
To test the hypotheses I use models estimated from panel data that include changes
in the percentage of ARC contributed every year by employer and the state, changes
in percentage of the fund invested in equity, changes in state unemployment, changes
in state revenue, changes in union membership, the annual returns on investments
in the S&P index (current and with a lag), the annual return on the 10-year treasury
2The Annual Required Contribution is the one which would cover the cost of benefits accruing
in the current year and payment to amortize the plan’s unfunded actuarial liability (Munell, 2012).
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bond (current and with a lag), and partisanship of the governor of the state. I use
the following reduced form specifications:
∆Yt = α +
t∑
k=1
βk · electoralyeark,t + γXt + ut
∆Yt = α+
t∑
k=1
βk ·electoralyeark,t+
t∑
k=1
δk ·electoralyeark,t ·partisanship+γXt+ut
where ∆Yt is the change in percentage points of the variable of interest in year t with
respect to the same variable in year t−1. The variable of interest is either percentual
change in ARC contributed or the share of fund assets invested in equity. Variables
electoralyeark,t are a series of dummies which indicate the year in the electoral
cycle. I include the year before the elections, the electoral year itself, and the year
after the elections, being the year in the middle of the cycle the omitted category. Xt
is the matrix of covariates and ut the residual. The parameters of interest are βk and
δk . I include state fixed effects when I do not include partisanship as a covariate.
Unfortunately, to avoid collinearity, I have to remove the state fixed effects in order to
incorporate the variable partisanship, since the majority of states did not experience
a party change during the analyzed period.
3.4 Data
Variables related to pension planswere incorporated from the Public PlansDatabase,
built, maintained, and published by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston
College, Center for State and Local Government Excellence, and National Associa-
tion of State Retirement Administrators (2017). I use 14 years in my sample, from
58
2001 to 2014;3 I include 154 state and local pension systems in the US and use
both local and state administered plans for 48 states. I removed from the analysis
the plans of New Hampshire and Vermont, since their gubernatorial elections are
done every two years as opposed to four years. The electoral variables timing of
the election and party of the governor were coded using information from David
Leip’s US Atlas of elections (2017). The public finance variables incorporated in
the estimations as controls were downloaded from the U.S. Census Bureau (2016).
Data for unemployment at the state level was downloaded from the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2017). Annual return on investments on the S&P and 10-year trea-
sury bond were calculated by Damodaran (2017). Data from labor unions consists
on the percentage of public sector workers unionized by state, this data comes from
Unionstats.com by Hirsch andMacpherson (2017). The distribution of the variables
used in the analysis can be found in Table 3.8.
Regarding ARC paid, states have evolved differently in recent years (see Table
3.11). Some states such as Alabama, Arizona, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Utah, exhibit a very stable pattern of paying the full ARC during the analyzed
period. Other states such as Alaska, Massachusetts, Nevada, and New York have
been increasing in recent years the percentage of ARC they have been contributing.
Unfortunately, there are also states with a negative trend of ARC contributions, such
as Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
West Virginia. The distribution of changes in ARC at the state level can be found in
Figure 3.1. As we can see, there are many observations in which the contribution
matched exactly the ARC. There is also an important number of cases in which the
ARC was not met. Contributions larger than the ARC are scarce.
( Figure 3.1 found at the end of this chapter)
3At the time this document was written there was only partial information for the year 2015.
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Regarding changes in ARC contributed (first differences of percentage ARC con-
tributed), we can see in Figure 3.11 that some states experience larger changes in
ARC contributed than others, but there is no clear trend for most states. The dis-
tribution of changes in contributions as percentage of ARC can be found in Figure
3.2, where it can be seen that (save from the mass of observations exactly at zero)
the data distribution is very well-behaved and symmetric around zero.
( Figure 3.2 found at the end of this chapter)
It is important to mention that even when contributing the full ARC, the pension
fund could be underfunded. The ARC is calculated using many assumptions which
could not be accurate. However, there is evidence that higher ARC contributions
are associated with better pension funding. Munell (2012) finds that making the
full ARC contribution increases the funded ratio by 6.8%. Using my sample, I
confirm the positive correlation between both. I calculate the correlation between
the average ARC contribution at the state level for 2001-2014 and the estimated
funding ratio for 2014 (See Tables 3.6 and 3.7). This correlation is 0.47, which is
sizable considering I am only incorporating 14 years of ARC contributions.
My second variable of interest is the percentage of the fund invested in equity.
States have evolved similarly with respect to the trend of equity as percentage of
pension funds. As we can observe in the Figure 3.11, the vast majority of states have
decreased the share of their funds invested in equity. This share declined during
the financial crisis, but even in recent years the trend continues to be negative. The
distribution of these percentages can be found in Figure 3.3. The mean and median
of the distribution of the fraction of funds invested in equity is around 55%. The
tail is heavier towards higher levels of equity.
( Figure 3.3 found at the end of this chapter)
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When we observe annual changes in the share of equity the trend disappears (see
Figure 3.11). The only important pattern I am able to identify is the sudden drop
during the financial crisis (2007-2008). However, there is not an abnormal mass
in the distribution of changes in ARC, as this can be seen in Figure 3.4. The
distribution of changes is centered around zero, as most states do not experience
important changes in the investment profile of their pension funds form one year to
another. However, there are enough observations in the tails such that I am able to
estimate the changes in this profile as a function of the electoral calendar.
( Figure 3.4 found at the end of this chapter)
3.5 Empirical Analysis
Plan vs State level analysis
I identified two possible ways of performing the analysis of political pension con-
tribution cycles: at the state, and at the plan level. I focus on the analysis using data
aggregated by state. Analysis using plan level data can be found in the appendix.
Working at the plan level has the advantage of having much more observations
for the analysis (close to 2,000 as opposed to around 600 in state level), and the
unobserved invariant characteristics of the unit of observation (fixed effects) are
much more specific at the plan level as opposed to the state. Rules, governance,
membership, and benefits are better defined at the plan in comparison to the state
level. However, working at the plan level also has disadvantages. One of these is
that there is large disparity between the number of plans each state has. For example,
California has fifteen plans in the sample, Illinois and Texas eight, and New York
and Minnesota seven. Meanwhile, there are six states with only one plan (see Table
3.5). By making estimates using plan level data as is, I would be biasing the results
towards states that have more plans. Another disadvantage of using plan level data
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is that, in principle, there are more budgetary incentives to under fund larger plans,
since small plans within the state exert much less pressure in the public finances. In
order to eliminate the disadvantages of working with plan level data, I aggregated
all plans within the state in order to have one observation per state per year.
Analysis at the State Level
In order to perform the analysis at the state level, it is necessary to aggregate all
individual plans in a state into one observation. To do this, I calculated the state’s
total employer contributions to the state plans as the sum of all contributions from the
employers and state government to each individual plan in the state. I also calculated
the total required contribution of the state as the sum of required contributions of
all plans. Finally, the state’s percentage ARC paid as the state’s total employer
contributions over the state’s required contribution.
ARC
My estimations of the changes in percentage ARC contributed as the function of the
electoral calendar can be found in Table 3.1. As we can see in column (1) during the
year preceding the election there is a decrease on average of 8.7 percentage points
of the ARC. During all other years of the electoral calendar we observe similar
levels of contributions of ARC. This result is robust to including the controls (see
column 2). In column (3) we can observe that this pattern of decreasing the ARC
in the pre-electoral year is more prevalent when we have a Democrat governor. I
do not include state fixed effects when I incorporate partisanship of the governor
columns (2) and (3) since the vast majority of states did not experience party change
in the analyzed period. Other controls do not reach statistical significance in my
estimations.
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(Table 3.1 found at the end of this chapter)
Using changes in the percentage ARC paid has the advantage of estimating the mag-
nitude of the pension under-contribution during pre-electoral years. However, it has
the disadvantage of overweighting outliers in the estimates. In order to account for
this, I propose an alternative specification of the model using a dichotomous depen-
dent variable in my estimations. Following the definition of Thom and Randazzo
(2015) I define a dichotomous variable “CompleteARCt” as 1 if the employers
contributed at least 95% of the required ARC in the fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise.
I use two different models to estimate the probability of contributing the Complete
ARC: a linear probability model, and a conditional logit model. The conditional
logit model allows us to incorporate state fixed effects. The results of this alternative
setup of the model can be found in Table 3.2. The results of the previous estima-
tion are consistent with the results presented in Table 3.1. I am able to see that it
is less likely to observe a complete ARC contribution in the pre-electoral year. I
estimate this decrease in probability in 9.3% for the linear model (see column 1).
This estimation is robust to including changes in unemployment, state revenue, and
partisanship of the governor (column 2). As we saw in the previous results, it is
more likely to observe the decrease in contribution in states which have a Democrat
governor, although it does not reach statistical significance. These results are con-
sistent when I used the conditional logit model (See Table 3.2 columns 4-6). As for
the controls, increases in union membership make it less likely to contribute the full
ARC, which goes in the expected direction, but it is not robust when incorporating
other controls. Investment return variables go in the opposite direction I expected.
Changes in unemployment and revenue do not reach statistical significance.
(Table 3.2 found at the end of this chapter)
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Investment in Equities
As I mentioned before, percentage ARC contributed is a direct way to measure the
political pension contribution cycle. However, there are factors in the specification
of pension’s funding requirements that can be modified in order to change this
contribution. One of these is the percentage of funds that are invested in equity.
Equities have higher return assumptions than bonds, but incur greater risk. In this
section I investigate whether the electoral calendar is associated with changes in the
composition of the pension fund portfolio measured with changes in the percentage
invested in equity. I have to be careful about how I incorporate this percentage of
equity in the estimation, since market movements change the value of equity, and
therefore its share of the value of the pension fund. To mitigate this problem, I will
only focus on relatively large equity changes. For this, I define two dichotomous
variables: DecreaseEquityt as 1 if the state’s percentage invested in equity in year
t was 5 percentage points smaller than in period t − 1; analogously I define the
variable IncreaseEquityit as 1 if the state’s percentage invested in equity in year t
was 5 percentage points greater than in period t − 1. The results of my estimations
can be found in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
(Table 3.3 found at the end of this chapter)
Regarding the decrease in equity (Table 3.3), I observe that all the regression
coefficients for the electoral calendar are negative. Recall that the omitted category
in the analysis is the second year after the election, that is, in the middle of the
electoral cycle. Therefore, we can conclude that during this year we observe a
decrease in percentage invested in equity. Reducing the share of equity can be
interpreted as taking a “safe” investment choice. The expected returns of the plan
decrease, and therefore the required contributions should be larger. What my
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estimates suggest is that conservative investment decisions are more likely to be
observed in non-electoral years. These results are robust to the addition of the
control variables. The direction of these controls are consistent to what I expected:
when the economy is having problems (reflected in high unemployment, decrease
in revenue, lower investment returns), the equity as percentage of the pension fund
decreases. Partisanship does not appear to be correlated with large decreases in
equity.
(Table 3.4 found at the end of this chapter)
For large increases in equity (Table 3.4), partisanship becomes very important in
order to interpret the political pension contribution cycle. When I do not directly
incorporate partisanship into the analysis of the cycle I get results that are not
expected. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), we observe that it is during the post-
electoral year when we observe increases in the percentage of equity in the pension
fund. However, when we incorporate partisanship the results completely change.
In columns (3) and (6) we are able to observe that for states which have Democrat
governors, the share of equity of the pension fund significantly increases during the
pre-electoral year. I am not able to identify any other large increase in equity during
other periods of the electoral cycle. This means that for states with Democratic
governors, there is an increase likelihood to observe a change towards a more risky
portfolio during the pre-electoral year. As for the controls, the variables related to the
economy do not appear to be associated with large increases in equity. Meanwhile,
the strength of labor unions appear to be natively correlated. States with stronger
labor unions are less likely to greatly increase investments in equity from one year
to another.
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3.6 Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Further Research
In this chapter I extend the literature of the political budget cycles at the subnational
level to include pension funding. I explore the relationship between state pension
funding and gubernatorial elections in the United States for the period 2001-2014.
I show that it is more likely to observe undercontributions to pension funds during
pre-electoral years. I estimate a decrease of 8.7% of the ARC paid to state pension
funds during the gubernatorial pre-electoral year compared to other years in the
electoral cycle.
I also identify changes in the risk profile of the pension fund as a function of the
electoral calendar. The percentage of the pension fund invested in equity is more
likely to decrease in non-electoral years. That is, more conservative investment
decisions, which in turn increase the annual required contribution, are more likely
to be observedwhen the election is still far away. I estimate an increase in probability
of 7% of significantly reducing the share of equities in the pension fund in the year
that is in the middle of the electoral cycle. The analog for higher risk is also true,
but conditional on the partisanship of the incumbent governor. I observe that for
states with Democratic governors there is an increased likelihood in significantly
increasing the risk profile of the pension fund in the state during the pre-electoral
year.
The principal policy implication of this chapter is the need to measure the politi-
cal budget cycle using accrual-based accounting instead of cash-based accounting,
which is currently the common practice (Irwin, 2015). Using accrual-based ac-
counting will make more transparent the off-balance sheet liabilites incurred by a
state in order to finance the deficit. The incorporation of pensions into the analysis
takes one step in this direction. Changing the contributions and investment profile
of the pension fund modifies expenditure not only for the current period, but also
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for the duration of the promised benefits, and its effects are not easily observed by
the population. The political budget cycles documented in the literature could thus
be significantly underestimated.
This chapter can be extended to also analyze the changes in benefits of the pen-
sion plan. It is possible that increases in benefits are more likely to be observed
when electoral gains for incumbent officials are greater, further deteriorating the
sustainability of the system. Analogously, reductions in benefits for future workers
could also be timed as a function of the electoral calendar. The same can be done
for changes in the assumptions used for actuarial studies of pension plans. Factors
such as an increase in the estimated return, years worked by the employee, and life
expectancy can dramatically change the funding status of the plan, and therefore the
required contributions of the government and taxpayers.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Estimations, State Level - Changes in ARC
Dependent variable:
Change in % of ARC Paid at State Level
(1) (2) (3)
Election − 1 −0.087∗ −0.073 −0.015
(0.052) (0.048) (0.066)
Election −0.044 −0.035 −0.013
(0.047) (0.045) (0.061)
Election + 1 −0.028 −0.014 0.013
(0.051) (0.048) (0.065)
∆ Unemployment 0.034 0.034
(0.022) (0.022)
∆ Revenue PC −0.010 −0.010
(0.016) (0.016)
Election − 1 × Democrat −0.125
(0.092)
Election × Democrat −0.057
(0.087)
Election + 1 × Democrat −0.060
(0.092)
Democrat −0.008 0.047
(0.024) (0.059)
S & P 500 0.141 0.352 0.374
(0.198) (0.238) (0.239)
T. Bond (10 year) 0.152 0.439 0.486
(0.447) (0.478) (0.484)
S & P 500 − 1 0.077 0.312 0.318
(0.194) (0.243) (0.244)
T. Bond (10 year) − 1 0.044 0.249 0.286
(0.398) (0.448) (0.449)
Union Membership 0.041 0.043
(0.051) (0.052)
∆ Union Membership 0.193 0.111 0.108
(0.557) (0.539) (0.540)
Constant −0.088 −0.122
(0.081) (0.087)
State Fixed Effects Yes No No
Observations 623 623 623
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.013 0.016
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.2: Estimations, State Level - Probability of Full ARC
Dependent variable:
Dichotomous ARC ≥ 95% at State Level
linear conditional logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −0.093∗ −0.099∗∗ −0.052 -0.880∗ -0.913∗ -0.626
(0.047) (0.048) (0.063) (0.373) (0.363) (0.472)
Election 0.040 −0.036 −0.034 -0.167 -0.225 -0.425
(0.043) (0.043) (0.058) (0.337) (0.341) (0.466)
Election + 1 −0.028 −0.037 −0.053 -0.355 -0.413 -0.624
(0.047) (0.047) (0.063) (0.357) (0.353) (0.477)
∆ Unemployment 0.003 0.004 -0.166 -0.152
(0.020) (0.020) (0.145) (0.148)
∆ Revenue PC 0.010 0.010 0.0297 0.0249
(0.015) (0.015) (0.100) (0.102)
Election − 1 × Democrat −0.096 -0.618
(0.087) (0.659)
Election × Democrat 0.005 0.376
(0.082) (0.609)
Election + 1 × Democrat 0.029 0.366
(0.086) (0.641)
Democrat −0.033 −0.020 -0.198 -0.268
(0.038) (0.064) (0.283) (0.469)
S & P 500 −0.527∗∗∗ −0.548∗∗ −0.519∗∗ -2.884∗ -3.651∗ -3.329∗
(0.180) (0.222) (0.223) (1.349) (1.497) (1.520)
T. Bond (10 year) −0.705∗ −0.721 −0.626 -3.222 -4.374 -3.349
(0.406) (0.444) (0.449) (3.190) (3.299) (3.379)
S & P 500 − 1 −0.204 −0.211 −0.219 -4.208∗∗∗ -5.280∗∗∗ -5.501∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.227) (0.228) (1.193) (1.470) (1.496)
T. Bond (10 year) − 1 −0.001 0.067 0.088 -5.616∗ -6.563∗ -6.720∗
(0.362) (0.417) (0.418) (2.661) (3.007) (3.072)
Union Membership −0.251 −0.255 -1.885 -1.901
(0.243) (0.243) (1.794) (1.805)
∆ Union Membership −0.906∗ −0.783 −0.798 -6.392 -5.662 -5.871
(0.506) (0.527) (0.528) (3.829) (3.908) (3.937)
Constant 0.710∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 2.451∗∗ 2.444∗∗
(0.118) (0.121) (0.823) (0.856)
State Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 623 6243 623 507 623 623
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.052 0.055
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.3: Estimations, State Level - Decrease in Equity
Dependent variable:
Dichotomous decrease of 5 points or more of equity at State Level
linear conditional logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −0.068∗ −0.065∗ −0.097∗ -0.472 -0.457 -0.976
(0.038) (0.037) (0.049) (0.415) (0.434) (0.668)
Election −0.070∗∗ −0.071∗∗ −0.034 -0.472 -0.255 0.467
(0.035) (0.034) (0.046) (0.390) (0.412) (0.539)
Election + 1 −0.072∗ −0.060 −0.028 -0.495 -0.396 0.0747
(0.038) (0.037) (0.049) (0.431) (0.433) (0.561)
∆ Unemployment 0.012 0.011 0.374∗ 0.384∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.163) (0.167)
∆ Revenue PC −0.021∗ −0.020∗ -0.136 -0.134
(0.012) (0.012) (0.130) (0.136)
Election − 1 × Democrat 0.062 0.757
(0.069) (0.786)
Election × Democrat −0.080 -1.723∗
(0.065) (0.843)
Election + 1 × Democrat −0.065 -0.940
(0.068) (0.817)
Democrat −0.013 0.011 -0.0995 0.276
(0.024) (0.047) (0.278) (0.455)
S & P 500 −0.671∗∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗ −0.571∗∗∗ -5.443∗∗∗ -3.072 -3.536
(0.145) (0.177) (0.177) (1.617) (2.028) (2.045)
T. Bond (10 year) −0.491 −0.316 −0.419 -7.488 -2.770 -4.549
(0.327) (0.354) (0.357) (4.026) (4.823) (4.864)
S & P 500 − 1 −0.571∗∗∗ −0.497∗∗∗ −0.487∗∗∗ 0.216 2.061 2.847
(0.142) (0.180) (0.180) (1.349) (1.705) (1.785)
T. Bond (10 year) − 1 −0.658∗∗ −0.749∗∗ −0.748∗∗ 6.049 6.142 7.540
(0.291) (0.331) (0.331) (3.208) (3.656) (3.872)
Union Membership 0.013 0.012 -0.0554 -0.0463
(0.064) (0.064) (0.767) (0.770)
∆ Union Membership 0.089 −0.008 0.039 0.886 0.828 1.644
(0.407) (0.406) (0.406) (4.824) (4.710) (4.769)
Constant 0.311∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ -2.145∗∗∗ -2.365∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.067) (0.645) (0.702)
State Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 622 622 622 532 622 622
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.108 0.115
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.4: Estimations, State Level - Increase in Equity
Dependent variable:
Dichotomous increase of 5 points or more of Equity at State Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −0.011 −0.010 −0.073∗ -0.147 -0.136 -1.519
(0.034) (0.033) (0.044) (0.526) (0.520) (0.846)
Election −0.001 0.0002 −0.021 0.0538 0.107 -0.219
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.494) (0.497) (0.632)
Election + 1 0.073∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.071 0.885∗ 0.938∗ 0.723
(0.033) (0.033) (0.044) (0.442) (0.441) (0.547)
∆ Unemployment 0.010 0.010 0.166 0.179
(0.014) (0.014) (0.220) (0.220)
∆ Revenue PC 0.001 0.001 0.0794 0.103
(0.011) (0.010) (0.176) (0.179)
Election − 1 × Democrat 0.129∗∗ 2.809∗
(0.061) (1.163)
Election × Democrat 0.043 0.913
(0.058) (0.996)
Election + 1 × Democrat 0.015 0.837
(0.061) (0.928)
Democrat 0.002 −0.042 0.0853 -0.954
(0.023) (0.042) (0.332) (0.794)
S & P 500 0.163 0.216 0.182 3.955 4.245 4.074
(0.128) (0.156) (0.156) (2.191) (2.559) (2.627)
T. Bond (10 year) 0.060 0.133 0.046 2.787 3.064 1.995
(0.289) (0.313) (0.315) (3.926) (4.260) (4.335)
S & P 500 − 1 0.109 0.179 0.179 1.935 3.014 3.180
(0.125) (0.160) (0.159) (1.688) (2.229) (2.264)
T. Bond (10 year) − 1 0.024 0.117 0.079 1.286 3.073 2.673
(0.257) (0.293) (0.293) (3.539) (4.302) (4.416)
Union Membership −0.175∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗ -2.894∗∗ -3.038∗∗
(0.067) (0.069) (1.055) (1.076)
∆ Union Membership −0.053 −0.008 −0.002 -1.051 -0.163 0.0725
(0.359) (0.360) (0.360) (5.510) (5.380) (5.445)
Constant 0.071 0.102∗ -3.094∗∗∗ -2.656∗∗
(0.058) (0.061) (0.860) (0.895)
State Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 622 622 622
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.038 0.045
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.5: Number of Pension Plans by State
State Plans State Plans
Alabama 2 Montana 2
Alaska 2 Nebraska 2
Arizona 4 Nevada 2
Arkansas 2 New Hampshire 1
California 15 New Jersey 3
Colorado 5 New Mexico 2
Connecticut 3 New York 7
Delaware 1 North Carolina 2
Florida 2 North Dakota 2
Georgia 3 Ohio 5
Hawaii 1 Oklahoma 3
Idaho 1 Oregon 2
Illinois 8 Pennsylvania 4
Indiana 2 Rhode Island 2
Iowa 2 South Carolina 2
Kansas 1 South Dakota 1
Kentucky 3 Tennessee 3
Louisiana 6 Texas 8
Maine 2 Utah 2
Maryland 3 Vermont 2
Massachusetts 2 Virginia 2
Michigan 4 Washington 5
Minnesota 7 West Virginia 2
Mississippi 1 Wisconsin 2
Missouri 6 Wyoming 1
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Table 3.6: Average ARC paid by State 2001-2014
State Average ARC Paid State Average ARC Paid
Oregon 155% Iowa 93%
West Virginia 116% Alaska 93%
Wyoming 112% Michigan 91%
Tennessee 110% Indiana 91%
Mississippi 105% New York 90%
Florida 103% Hawaii 90%
Idaho 103% Texas 90%
Georgia 102% Kentucky 90%
North Carolina 102% Louisiana 89%
Rhode Island 101% Montana 88%
Wisconsin 101% New Mexico 87%
Arkansas 101% Minnesota 86%
Arizona 100% Kansas 84%
Alabama 100% Maryland 83%
Delaware 100% Ohio 83%
Utah 100% Washington 81%
Maine 99% Virginia 80%
South Carolina 98% Colorado 79%
South Dakota 98% North Dakota 76%
Nebraska 96% Oklahoma 74%
California 96% Massachusetts 71%
Connecticut 94% Illinois 70%
Nevada 94% Pennsylvania 64%
Missouri 93% New Jersey 42%
3Source: Own calculations based on the Public Plans Database (2017)
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Table 3.7: Funding Percentage of Pension Plans by State 2014
State Funding State Funding
South Dakota 100% Nevada 72%
Wisconsin 100% Montana 70%
North Carolina 96% Virginia 70%
Idaho 94% New Mexico 70%
Delaware 92% Maryland 69%
Oregon 92% Arizona 69%
Washington 92% Alabama 67%
Tennessee 90% South Carolina 64%
Florida 86% North Dakota 63%
Utah 84% Indiana 63%
Maine 83% Colorado 63%
Iowa 82% Michigan 62%
Nebraska 81% Massachusetts 62%
Texas 81% Kansas 62%
New York 81% Rhode Island 62%
Missouri 81% Louisiana 62%
Georgia 80% Hawaii 61%
Wyoming 79% New Jersey 61%
Arkansas 77% Mississippi 61%
Minnesota 76% Pennsylvania 61%
Ohio 75% Alaska 58%
California 75% Connecticut 52%
Oklahoma 73% Kentucky 49%
West Virginia 73% Illinois 48%
3Source: Own calculations based on the Public Plans Database (2017)
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Table 3.8: Variable Distribution (Mean and S.D.)
Variable State Level Plan Level
% ARC Paid 0.93 0.94
(0.38) (0.53)
Change in % ARC Paid 0 0
(0.42) (0.66)
% Invested in Equities 0.54 0.52
(0.1) (0.15)
Change % Invested in Equities 0 0
(0.06) (0.1)
Unemployment (%) 6.11 6.4
(2.04) (2.04)
Change in Unemployment (%) 0 0
(1.27) (1.28)
Number of Democrats (observations) 307 1,304
Observations 672 2,170
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California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS, 2016)
Table 3.9: CalPERS’ Investment Regime
Asset Class Target Range
Growth 59% 52-66%
Global Equity 47% 40-54
Private Equity 12% 8-16%
Income - Global Fixed Income 19% 14-24%
Real Assets 14% 9-19%
Real Estate 11% 6-16%
Infrastructure & Forestland 3% 1-5%
Inflation 6% 3-9%
Liquidity 2% +/-6
Total Fund 100%
Table 3.10: CalPERS’ Board
Represented Party # Appointed by
All members 2 All members
Active State Members 1 Active State Members
Active School Members 1 Active School Members
Public Agency Members 1 Public Agency Members
Retirees 1 Retirees
Governor (Official of a Local
Govt)
1 Governor
Governor (Official of Life
Insurer)
1 Governor
Public Representative 1 Jointly by speaker of the Assembly and
the Senate
State Treasurer 1 Ex Officio
State Controller 1 Ex Officio
Director of California Human
Resources
1 Ex Officio
Representative of State
Personnel Board
1 Ex Officio
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California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS, 2016)
Table 3.11: CalSTRS’ Investment Regime
Asset Class Target Range
Global Equity 47% 41-53%
Private Equity 13% 10-16%
Real Estate 13% 10-16%
Total Equity 73%
Inflation Sensitive 4% 1-7%
Fixed Income 12% 9-15%
Cash 2% +/- 3%
Risk Mitigating Strategies 9% 6-12%
Innovative Strategies 0% +/- 3%
Total Diversifying 27%
Total 100%
Table 3.12: CalSTRS’ Board
Represented Party # Appointed by
Current Educators 3 Members
Retired CalSTRS 1 Governor, approved by Senate
Public Servants 3 Governor, approved by Senate
School Board 1 Governor, approved by Senate
Director of Finance 1 Ex Officio
State Controller 1 Ex Officio
State Superintendent 1 Ex Officio
State Treasurer 1 Ex Officio
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Florida Retirement System (FRS, 2014)
Table 3.13: FRS’ Investment Regime
Asset Class Target Range
Global Equity 53% 45 - 65%
Fixed Income 18% 10 - 26%
Real Estate 10% 4 - 16%
Private Equity 6% 2- 9%
Strategic Investments 12% 0 - 16%
Cash Equivalents 1% 0.75 - 5%
Total Fund 100%
Table 3.14: FRS’ Board
Represented Party # Appointed by
Governor 1 Constitution
Chief Financial Officer 1 Constitution
Attorney General 1 Constitution
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Teacher Retirement System of Texas (TRS, 2016)
Table 3.15: TRS’s Investment Regime
Asset Class Target Range
Global Equity 57% 50 -68%
Stable Value 16% 11-23%
Real Return 22% 17-27%
Risk Parity 5% 0-10%
Total 100%
Table 3.16: TRS’ Board
Represented Party # Appointed by
Governor 3 Governor
Board of Education 2 Governor from a list of the Board
Active members (Teachers) 3 Governor from nominations of school districts
Higher Education Teachers 1 Governor from nominatios of higher education
Retirees 1 Governor from list of retirees
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New York State Teachers’ Retirement System (NYSTRS, 2016)
Table 3.17: NYSTRS’ Investment Regime
Asset Class Target Range
Domestic Equity 35% 31 - 39%
International Equity 18% 14 - 22%
Domestic Fixed 16% 12 - 20%
Income
Real Estate 11% 6 - 16%
Real Estate Debt 8% 4 - 12%
Private Equity 8% 3 - 13%
Global Bonds 2% 0 - 3%
High Yield Bonds 1% 0 - 3%
Short Term Investments (Cash Equivalents) 1% 0 - 4%
Total 100%
Table 3.18: NYSTRS’ Board
Represented Party # Appointed by
Teachers 3 Teachers delegates
Retirees 1 Retirees
School Administrators 2 Commissioner of Education
School Board 2 School Board
Bank Executive 1 Board of Regents
State Comptroller 1 Statutory
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3.8 School Employees’ Retirement System of Ohio (OHSERS, 2015)
Table 3.19: OHSERS’ Investment Regime
Asset Class Target Range
Equity 55% 45 - 65%
Global Equities 45% 35 - 55%
Global Private Equity 10% 5 - 15%
Income 35% 30 – 40%
Global Bonds 19% 12 - 26%
Global Real Assets 15% 10 - 20%
Cash Equivalents 1% 0 - 5%
STRATEGY
Multi-Asset Strategies 10% 5 - 15%
Opportunistic Investments 0% 0 – 5%
Total 100%
Table 3.20: OHSERS’ Board
Represented Party # Appointed by
Employee (Teachers) 4 Employees (Teachers)
Retiree 2 Retirees
Investment Expert 1 Governor
Investment Expert 1 Treasurer
Investment Expert 1 House & Senate
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3.9 Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS, 2017)
Table 3.21: OPERS’ investment regime
Asset Class Target Range
Public Equity 39% 31 to 47%
U.S. Equity ** +/- 5%
Non-U.S. Equity ** +/- 5%
Fixed Income 23% 16 to 30%
Core Fixed 9 6 to 12
Emerging Markets Debt 7 3 to 9
Floating Rate Debt 0 0 to 2
Securitized Debt 1 0 to 2
TIPS 2 1 to 3
High Yield 3 0 to 5
U.S. Treasury 1 0 to 2
Alternatives 31% 22 to 40%
Private Equity 10 5 to 15
Real Estate 10 5 to 15
Hedge Funds 8 4 to 12
Opportunistic 2 0 to 4
Commodities 1 0 to 2
Risk Parity 5% 2 to 8%
GTAA 2% 0 to 4%
Operating Cash 0% 0 to 3%
Total 100%
Table 3.22: OPERS’ Board
Represented Party # Appointed by
Retirees 2 Retirees
Non-teaching College/University Employees 1 Non-teaching College/ University
Employees
Treasurer-Appointed Investment Expert 1 Treasurer
General Assembly Appointed Investment
Expert
1 General Assembly
Ohio Department of Administrative Services 1 Statutory Member
Miscellaneous Employees 1 Miscellaneous Employees
State Employees 1 State Employees
County Employees 1 County Employees
Municipal Employees 1 Municipal Employees
Governor 1 Governor
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3.10 Figures
Figure 3.1: Distribution of % ARC Paid by Employer at State Level
Percentage of ARC paid by employer
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Changes of % ARC Paid by Employer at State Level
Changes in Percentage of ARC paid by employer
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of % Invested in Equities at State Level
Percentage of state funds invested in equity
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Changes of % Invested in Equities at State Level
Changes in Percentage of state funds invested in equity
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3.11 Appendices
Plan Level Analysis
Analysis at the Plan Level
In this appendix I use individual plans as units of observation. As I did for state
level analysis, I explore the relationship of both percentage ARC contributed, and
the percentage equity has as the total value of the pension fund as a function of the
electoral calendar. Having similar results as the state level would indicate that the
dynamics of pension funds are more or less independent of their size and importance
in the state. Meanwhile, if results are attenuated towards zero it would indicate that
the cycle is much more prevalent in large plans, and meanwhile there are fewer
incentives to modify funding decisions for smaller plans.
I present the distribution of ARC contributions, percentage invested in equity, and
their respective changes in Figures 3.5-3.8. The characteristics of these are very
similar to their state counterparts. However, I identified two important differences.
Most plans contribute full ARC transfers (and their received contributions do not
change from one year to the next), so the large changes in contributions we observed
at the state level are being driven by a relatively small number of plans. The second
difference is that there is a (small) number of plans which do not invest in equity at
all (Figure 3.7). The pattern we observed at the state level of the continuity of the
same investment profile is also reflected at the plan level (Figure 3.8).
( Figures 3.5-3.8 found at the end of this chapter)
ARC
My estimations of the changes in percentage ARC contributed can be found in
Table 3.23. As we can see in column (1) the relationship found when exploring
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the state level disappears. I do not find this relationship when I include changes
in unemployment, changes in revenue, and partisanship of the governor in the
regression (see column 2). As I mentioned before, this provides evidence in favor
of the hypothesis that we observe larger cycles the larger the plan is within the state.
(Table 3.23 found at the end of this chapter)
Only when I include the interaction of changes in ARC with the partisanship of the
governor are we able to observe a pattern. In column (3) we see that, on average,
plans in states with a Democrat governor are receiving fewer employer contributions
as percentage of the ARC during the preelectoral year, making the reduction of
contribution in such states more uniform despite their size more prevalent in pre-
electoral years. 4
(Table 3.24 found at the end of this chapter)
In order to test the robustness of the results I also use the dichotomous dependent
variable specification. Again I follow Thom and Randazzo (2015) to define the
dummy variable “CompleteARCt” as 1 if the employers contributed at least 95%
of the required ARC in the fiscal year t, and 0 otherwise. As it was the case with
the state level, I use both a linear probability model and a conditional logit model.
The results of this alternative setup of the model can be found in Table 3.24. The
conclusions I get from this setup align with the results of the previous case with
some exceptions. In the baseline model (columns (1) and (4)) I do not observe
either the political pension contribution cycle, providing evidence in favor of the
mitigation for smaller plans. When I control for other variables, only in the linear
4As it was the case with states as units of observation, I do not include state fixed effects in
columns (2) and (3) since the vast majority of states did not experience party change in the analyzed
period.
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probability model (column 2), I observe a decrease in probability of contributing
the full ARC, but even in this case the likelihood of observing full payment of ARC
decreases to less than half (4.2%) compared to aggregating by state (11.1%). In
conclusion, we can say that for changes in ARC contributed, and also for observing
the political pension contribution cycle, it is better to use data aggregated at the state
level and not use data at the individual plan level, since the most important changes
are observed in the largest plans.
Investment in Equities
As I did in the state case, I also analyzed changes in percentage of equity in the
pension fund as the function of the electoral calendar. Refer to section 3.5 for a
description of the variables used and their implications. Regarding the decrease in
equity (Table 3.25) at the plan level, and consistent with the results we have at the
state level, we observe that all the regression coefficients for the electoral calendar
are negative. Therefore, I can conclude that during the middle of the electoral cycle
we observe a decrease in percentage invested in equity. The interpretation is the
same as section 3.5: more conservative investment decisions are generally made
in non electoral years. The interesting result here, and consistent with my findings
regarding ARC contributions (Section 3.11), is that this change of more conservative
portfolios is larger at the state than at the plan level. That is, larger plans experience
larger changes in portfolio composition compared to smaller plans. These results
are robust to including economic variables in the estimation such as changes in
unemployment and state revenue, as well as the partisanship of the governor.
(Table 3.25 found at the end of this chapter)
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For large increases in equity (Table 3.26), I get very similar estimations as for the
state level. Partisanship is very important in order to interpret the political pension
contribution cycle. When I do not directly incorporate partisanship into the analysis
of the cycle I get results that are not expected. In columns (1), (2), (4), and (5), we
observe that is during the post electoral year when we see increases in the percentage
of equity in the pension fund, which go against what I expected. Meanwhile, when
I incorporate partisanship we are able to observe that for states with Democrat
governors incur in the change in equity. However, there is an important difference in
these estimations compared to ARC contribution and decrease in equities. I do not
observe a decrease in the cycle when I use the plan level compared to the state level.
This suggests that large increases in equity are more prevalent in smaller plans as
opposed to larger plans, and this goes against what I expected. The rationalization
of this pattern is open for discussion.
(Table 3.26 found at the end of this chapter)
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Table 3.23: Estimations, Plan Level - Changes in ARC
Dependent variable:
Change in % of ARC Paid at Plan Level
(1) (2) (3)
Election − 1 0.011 −0.002 0.049
(0.051) (0.036) (0.056)
Election 0.067 0.064 0.020
(0.047) (0.044) (0.058)
Election + 1 0.010 −0.007 −0.037
(0.050) (0.037) (0.056)
∆ Unemployment 0.004 0.003
(0.018) (0.018)
∆ Revenue PC −0.009 −0.010
(0.015) (0.015)
Election − 1 × Democrat −0.185∗∗
(0.073)
Election × Democrat 0.168∗∗∗
(0.061)
Election + 1 × Democrat 0.113
(0.070)
Democrat −0.005 −0.012
(0.010) (0.048)
S & P 500 −0.251 −0.212 −0.183
(0.195) (0.210) (0.210)
T. Bond (10 year) −0.234 −0.080 0.011
(0.447) (0.463) (0.465)
S & P 500 − 1 0.291 0.223 0.183
(0.186) (0.198) (0.200)
T. Bond (10 year) − 1 0.449 0.212 0.170
(0.386) (0.430) (0.433)
Union Membership 0.009 0.014
(0.010) (0.009)
∆ Union Membership −0.784 −0.262 −0.228
(0.555) (0.370) (0.336)
Constant −0.033 −0.019
(0.061) (0.066)
Plan Fixed Effects Y N N
Observations 1,926 1,927 1,927
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.008 0.009
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.24: Estimations, Plan Level - Probability of Full ARC
Dependent variable:
Dichotomous ARC ≥ 95% at Plan Level
linear conditional logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −0.022 −0.047∗ −0.054 -0.381 -0.438 -0.510
(0.025) (0.025) (0.033) (0.223) (0.224) (0.292)
Election 0.046∗∗ −0.016 −0.003 -0.0155 -0.0986 -0.0429
(0.023) (0.025) (0.034) (0.226) (0.230) (0.301)
Election + 1 0.022 0.0002 0.020 0.0695 0.0400 0.178
(0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.224) (0.225) (0.304)
∆ Unemployment −0.021∗∗ −0.021∗∗ -0.174∗ -0.172∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.0871) (0.0871)
∆ Revenue PC −0.005 −0.005 -0.0412 -0.0434
(0.008) (0.008) (0.0685) (0.0686)
Election − 1 × Democrat 0.014 0.156
(0.044) (0.399)
Election × Democrat −0.024 -0.108
(0.043) (0.394)
Election + 1 × Democrat −0.035 -0.248
(0.044) (0.398)
Democrat −0.004 0.007 0.0673 0.118
(0.019) (0.033) (0.174) (0.299)
S & P 500 −0.519∗∗∗ −0.506∗∗∗ −0.513∗∗∗ -4.142∗∗∗ -4.628∗∗∗ -4.705∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.111) (0.112) (0.876) (0.993) (0.999)
T. Bond (10 year) −0.743∗∗∗ −0.627∗∗∗ −0.653∗∗∗ -4.894∗ -5.631∗∗ -5.845∗∗
(0.219) (0.239) (0.242) (2.012) (2.133) (2.150)
S & P 500 − 1 −0.028 −0.507∗∗∗ −0.497∗∗∗ -3.341∗∗∗ -4.571∗∗∗ -4.502∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.103) (0.104) (0.752) (0.950) (0.957)
T. Bond (10 year) − 1 0.139 −0.782∗∗∗ −0.777∗∗∗ -5.231∗∗ -7.182∗∗∗ -7.218∗∗∗
(0.189) (0.223) (0.226) (1.672) (1.987) (1.999)
Union Membership −0.028 −0.038 -0.577 -0.543
(0.141) (0.136) (1.290) (1.293)
∆ Union Membership −0.363 −0.393 −0.386 -2.906 -3.037 -3.075
(0.271) (0.281) (0.283) (2.321) (2.449) (2.454)
Constant 0.784∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗ 2.786∗∗∗ 2.761∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.622) (0.635)
Plan Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 1,930 1,931 1,931 1211 1931 1931
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.043 0.044
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.25: Estimations, Plan Level - Decrease in Equity
Dependent variable:
Dichotomous decrease of 5 points or more of Equity at Plan Level
linear conditional logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −0.044∗ −0.011 −0.009 -0.148 -0.0730 -0.0304
(0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.212) (0.221) (0.302)
Election −0.084∗∗∗ −0.028 0.011 -0.439∗ -0.282 0.134
(0.021) (0.023) (0.031) (0.208) (0.221) (0.294)
Election + 1 −0.078∗∗∗ −0.043∗ −0.011 -0.425 -0.359 -0.0869
(0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.218) (0.226) (0.307)
∆ Unemployment 0.047∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.0862) (0.0865)
∆ Revenue PC −0.016∗∗ −0.015∗∗ -0.142 -0.142
(0.007) (0.007) (0.0753) (0.0757)
Election − 1 × Democrat −0.006 -0.0849
(0.041) (0.381)
Election × Democrat −0.075∗ -0.877∗
(0.039) (0.405)
Election + 1 × Democrat −0.059 -0.496
(0.041) (0.404)
Democrat 0.004 0.041 -0.00721 0.313
(0.015) (0.029) (0.150) (0.252)
S & P 500 −0.552∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗ −0.218∗∗ -3.526∗∗∗ -1.020 -1.124
(0.088) (0.100) (0.100) (0.816) (1.016) (1.016)
T. Bond (10 year) −0.068 0.122 0.081 -2.392 2.388 1.862
(0.202) (0.219) (0.220) (2.014) (2.373) (2.379)
S & P 500 − 1 −0.685∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.242∗∗ -0.314 1.585 1.899∗
(0.085) (0.096) (0.097) (0.707) (0.907) (0.926)
T. Bond (10 year) − 1 −0.840∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ 0.559∗∗∗ 4.425∗∗ 4.852∗ 5.328∗∗
(0.174) (0.202) (0.203) (1.629) (1.904) (1.941)
Union Membership −0.059 −0.059 -0.734 -0.727
(0.043) (0.043) (0.437) (0.437)
∆ Union Membership 0.090 0.079 0.105 0.578 0.814 1.208
(0.248) (0.251) (0.251) (2.554) (2.499) (2.512)
Constant 0.137∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ -2.160∗∗∗ -2.348∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.039) (0.348) (0.375)
Plan Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 2,014 2,015 2,015 1664 2015 2015
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.080 0.083
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.26: Estimations, Plan Level - Increase in Equity
Dependent variable:
Dichotomous increase of 5 points or more of Equity at Plan Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Election − 1 −0.040∗ −0.033 −0.078∗∗∗ -0.441 -0.338 -0.855∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.251) (0.245) (0.320)
Election −0.005 0.002 −0.032 -0.115 0.0386 -0.318
(0.020) (0.022) (0.029) (0.252) (0.244) (0.309)
Election + 1 0.034 0.036∗ 0.019 0.325 0.349 0.128
(0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.229) (0.224) (0.286)
∆ Unemployment 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗ 0.256∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.0912) (0.0910)
∆ Revenue PC 0.006 0.006 0.0815 0.0749
(0.007) (0.007) (0.0803) (0.0801)
Election − 1 × Democrat 0.092∗∗ 1.211∗∗
(0.039) (0.466)
Election × Democrat 0.066∗ 0.829
(0.037) (0.443)
Election + 1 × Democrat 0.036 0.607
(0.039) (0.427)
Democrat −0.015 −0.063∗∗ -0.171 -0.831∗
(0.014) (0.027) (0.154) (0.334)
S & P 500 0.086 0.156 0.147 1.305 2.166 2.145
(0.084) (0.095) (0.095) (0.963) (1.107) (1.116)
T. Bond (10 year) −0.172 −0.029 −0.038 -1.519 0.309 0.351
(0.192) (0.207) (0.207) (2.110) (2.195) (2.214)
S & P 500 − 1 −0.017 0.099 0.083 -0.450 1.366 1.228
(0.081) (0.091) (0.091) (0.805) (1.019) (1.027)
T. Bond (10 year) − 1 0.002 0.189 0.139 -0.897 2.539 1.984
(0.166) (0.190) (0.192) (1.863) (2.141) (2.168)
Union Membership −0.131∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ -1.458∗∗∗ -1.498∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.421) (0.424)
∆ Union Membership −0.103 −0.096 −0.123 -1.438 -1.204 -1.464
(0.236) (0.236) (0.237) (2.617) (2.591) (2.614)
Constant 0.128∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ -2.134∗∗∗ -1.822∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.036) (0.375) (0.392)
Plan Fixed Effects Yes No No Yes No No
Observations 2,014 2,015 2,015 1534 2015 2015
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.025 0.028
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of % ARC Paid by Employer at Plan Level
Percentage of ARC paid by employer
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of Changes of % ARC Paid by Employer at Plan Level
Changes in Percentage of ARC paid by employer
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Figure 3.7: Distribution of % Invested in Equities at Plan Level
Percentage of pension funds invested in equity
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Figure 3.8: Distribution of Changes of % Invested in Equities at Plan Level
Changes in Percentage of pension funds invested in equity
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C h a p t e r 4
POLITICAL CREDIT RATING CYCLES: EVIDENCE FROM
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS IN MEXICO
4.1 Abstract
Do credit rating agencies adjust the timing of their rating announcements as a func-
tion of the electoral calendar? I develop a formal model of the political credit rating
game, collect a novel database using credit ratings of Mexican states, and estimate
panel models for gubernatorial elections in Mexico for 2005-2015. Both formal
and empirical results indicate that credit rating agencies delay announcing rating
downgrades until after elections, especially when elections are very competitive.
4.2 Introduction
“To judge from their behavior, all the rating agencies worried about was maximizing
the number of deals they rated for Wall Street investment banks, and the fees they
collected from them.”
Michael Lewis - The Big Short (2011)
This chapter investigates the dynamics of credit rating announcements for govern-
ments during electoral periods. Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) have become a key
player in the democratic process. The agencies use financial, economic, and legal
information to evaluate the performance of public financial entities. Since a nega-
tive evaluation from the CRAs implies problems with the administration of public
resources, it is important to determine if CRAs are doing their job properly. If so,
they promote electoral accountability and responsible use of the public finances. If
not, they do not.
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Information about incumbent officials is often incomplete, imprecise, and costly to
acquire. Many voters thus rely on shortcuts, or cues, to make decisions (Sniderman,
Brody, and Tetlock, 1993). One of the most important cues is the state of the
economy. Tufte (1980) shows that economic performance in the months preceding
an election can tip the political balance. Voters reward incumbents for prosperity
and punish them for recession. Given this, incumbent officials have strong incentives
to make sure that voters perceive the economy as prosperous before elections. As a
result, as Nordhaus (1975) first showed, within an incumbents’ term in office there
is a predictable pattern in policy in which there is austerity in early years of the term
and more flexibility before the elections.
Political budget cycles create a bias between how the economy appears to be at
present and how it is actually going to perform in the long term. But it is not easy
for voters to figure out that difference. In fact, the incumbent government can take
actions that are not welfare-optimal, but send signals that look good to voters.
For more than 35 years, the mainstream approach to macroeconomic stability
has been to follow the guidelines summarized in the Washington Consensus by
Williamson (1990). These guidelines place a heavy emphasis on restricting the
government’s ability to manipulate the economy, on promoting fiscal discipline, and
on insuring that that public expenditure directed towards investments, privatization
of state enterprises, and deregulation.
Limiting the capacity of the government to intervene in the economy is not a new
objective. After theGloriousRevolution, the creation of theBank of England in 1694
greatly limited the ability of the British crown to renege on its obligations (North
andWeingast, 1989). The concept of an independent central bank has persisted, and
many countries rely on an independent central bank to hopefully separate the political
and the economic objectives of the government. Controlling government spending
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has followed a different strategy. Here the focus is on transparency. In democracies
all around the world, governments are required to publish regular financial data
reports. However, in many instances governments have the capacity to manipulate
financial statements, and it would be extremely costly for individual citizens to verify
the veracity of the published balance sheet and make predictions about the status of
current and future public finances. To fulfill these roles, independent monitors such
as financial auditors and CRAs are included. Financial auditors verify the accuracy
of financial statements (AICPA, 2015), while CRAs evaluate and make inferences
about the public finances.
CRAs provide information about a debtor’s ability to meet their financial obligations
through their credit ratings. A credit rating is an assessment of the creditworthiness
of a debt instrument or obligor, based on analytical models, assumptions, and
expectations (SEC, Investor Education, and Advocacy, 2013). Credit ratings are
particularly useful when there is relevant, non-verifiable information (Parlour and
Rajan, 2015). Because their ratings are forward looking, CRAs provide a signal of
the government’s long-term economic performance.
There is a problem, however. The problem with CRAs as supervising agents is that
they are paid by the same entity they are supposed to rate, and different agencies
compete for the same business. It has been shown that CRAs do not always behave
in a way that maximizes information disclosing.
A number of previous studies have investigated how competition in the rating agency
market affects ratings. These studies all focus on the private sector, i.e., on the
corporate bond market. Becker and Milbourne (2011) find that the introduction and
subsequent penetration of Fitch Ratings into the US market changed the dynamics
of the bond rating market. They find that with increased competition, ratings went
up, the correlations between bond yield and rating fell, and the ability of ratings to
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accurate predict defaults deteriorated. Indeed, Flynn and Ghent (2017) show that
new entrants in the rating agency market are more likely to assign higher ratings,
indicating that they compete in ratings. Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) use a
formal model to show that because of rating shopping and fee renegotiation, rating
efficiency may be higher under a monopoly CRA than under a duopoly despite the
potential for the increased informativeness of two ratings. They find that having
only one rating agency reflects risk more accurately compared to two. Griffin et
al. (2013) suggest that the inflation in ratings is more likely derived from rating
catering than rating shopping: in rating shopping firms only keep the highest, while
in rating catering firms selectively disclose their rating from one agency or another.
This pushes ratings up, and they find that the quality of ratings is lower for bonds
that are rated by two CRAs compared to only one.
A challenge to all these accounts of competition and rating inflation is that CRAs
would presumably not risk their reputation by not accurately reporting their assess-
ments. However, Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) show formally, and with
data, that reputation incentives are not enough to make CRAs accurately report
ratings. Skreta et al. (2009) show that rating inflation is more prevalent in markets
where the assets to be rated are more complex. When assets are simple, agencies’
ratings are similar and the incentive to ratings shop is low. When assets are suffi-
ciently complex, ratings differ enough that an incentive to shop emerges. There are
alternative explanations about why competition reduces rating quality. The most
prevailing is the aforementioned rating shopping/catering one. However, there is an
alternative explanation by Kashyap and Kovrijnykh (2013), who endogeneize the
quality of the signal the rating agency receives depending on the level of effort it
invests. More competition produce lower fees, leading to lower efforts and less ac-
curate ratings. This theory explains a decrease in the accuracy of the signal, but does
not explain the bias towards higher grades that is observed. All these explanations
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differ in their causation of rating inaccuracy, but have in common the existence of a
bias towards higher ratings, which I address in this chapter.
The behavior of CRAs with respect to the public sector has received far less scrutiny.
What literature there is focuses exclusively on the national level. Block and Vaaler
(2004) analyze whether the political budget cycle is relevant to foreign investors, and
see that it is more likely to observe a downgrade 60 days before an election. Vaaler,
Schrage, and Block (2006) complement and expand on this study by pointing out that
not only do elections matter, but also if the party in power is likely to change. Right-
wing governments are preferred by CRAs, but are penalized in electoral years even
when they are safe in power. The political budget cycle undermines creditworthiness
for more fiscally disciplined governments. Finally, Hanuusch and Vaaler (2013) find
that CRAs can extend their influence via ratings and reduce the size of the budget
deficit in electoral years.
While these papers study the relationship between the budget cycle and credit ratings,
they do not examine the possibility that CRAs might have incentives to delay rating
downgrades during electoral periods. The government is the client of the CRA,
and they might well demand high ratings during electoral periods to be reelected.
Incumbent officeholders would correspondingly want to avoid rating downgrades
during electoral periods, because this information sends the signal of low quality of
their governance.
This chapter fills this gap in previous research by studying the political credit rating
cycle itself. I define a political credit rating cycle as a predictable change in the
credit rating assigned to a governmental entity, or its debt, by a CRA as a function
of the electoral calendar. This is independent of changes attributable to the budget
cycle (for example budget balance, changes in debt) and the business cycle (i.e.
growth or contraction of the economy as a function of the election).
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To perform the analysis I develop a theoretical model that incorporates the incentives
of governments and rating agencies. I then test the predictions generated by model
using data on debt ratings for states in Mexico. In general, subnational data is
extremely useful in comparative analysis. As Alt and Rose (2007) argue, restricting
the domain of analysis to the subnational level holds relatively constant a wide
range of socio-economic, political, and cultural characteristics that might otherwise
confound the analysis. Additionally, states are unable to expand the monetary base.
In Mexico, the state ratings market has the additional appealing characteristic of
having ratings assigned to the state itself and not to particular individual bond
emissions. This removes another potential source of identification problems.
4.3 The Ratings Agency Market
To understand the credit ratings market we need to consider the size of this market,
what is at stake with a rating adjustment, and the incentives (and deterrents) to adjust
the timing of these change in ratings. As Table 4.1 shows, the top three agencies,
S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, account for more than 95% of the global market.
(Table 4.1 found at the end of this chapter)
At first glance, one might imagine that the central offices in New York or London
understand that their reputations are at stake, and work to ensure that ratings are
fair and timely. Indeed, the three largest CRAs have sizable resources: S&P
Rating Services had 2.45 billion in revenue in 2014; during the same year Moody’s
reported revenue of $3.3 billion, while Fitch Group’s various businesses generated
total revenues of $1.1 billion. These three companies employ more than 29,000
people worldwide. If investors were to desert unreliable companies, a significant
proportion of this revenue might be lost. Mexico is a tiny percentage of the global
activity of any CRA, accounting for about 1% of the number of assigned ratings for
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Moody’s and S&P, and 6% for Fitch (See Table 4.2). One might well think that a
CRA would not want to take a reputational risk in a market of the size of Mexico.
(Table 4.2 found at the end of this chapter)
While this may be the view of the home office, it is not the case for the Mexico
City office. For the analysts that work in Mexico and are responsible for the ratings
I analyze in this chapter, Mexican paper is the core of their business. Moreover,
these offices are small: Fitch, S&P, and Moody’s Mexico only have 57, 51, and
28 analysts respectively (and less than 20 are the public finance division in any
firm). When a local office loses a client, it loses in two fronts. That client ceases
to pay the continuation fees for the rating, and it can no longer sell the analysis to
potential investors. Indeed, once a client decides to no longer be rated (the rating
is withdrawn) all information regarding the client is considered confidential. The
performance and survival of thewhole public finance branch inMexico thus depends
on keeping a small number of clients satisfied. Clearly, there is a principal-agent
problem within the firm. The parent companies very well might want to keep their
reputation intact, but their local analysts want to maximize the number of clients.
If private solutions to principal agent problems in credit ratings are threatened by
the importance of local knowledge and firm decentralization, one might think that
regulation can take care of them. Since the three main CRAs in Mexico are foreign,
they have to comply with both their home and Mexican regulations. Several points
in this regulations are directed towards reducing the opportunities of collusion and
the incentives to do so: 1) CRAs are required to use all credible and potentially
significant information available to assign a rating, including the one received from
a source other than the client 2) CRAs are prohibited from issuing or maintaining
a credit rating where a person within the CRA who participates in determining or
monitoring the credit rating also participates in sales or marketing of a product or
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service of the CRA or is influenced by sales or marketing considerations. Sales or
marketing is defined as “pitching” the services, offering subscription to the CRA,
or providing information about the costs of the CRA. 3) There are limitations on
how much revenue a CRA can get from a single client, as it should not exceed 5 to
10% the CRA revenue. Yet these regulations at best mitigate the problem because
individual raters do not want to lose clients.
Other regulations, although directed towards increasing efficiency in ratings, have
the potential to increase the incentive for collusion. For example, in Mexico CRAs
are required to submit their financial information to the regulation office. Because
this information is confidential, it cannot be audited by the general public or financial
entities. Further, CRAs are required to notify their client when a rating is going to
be modified, perhaps to verify the rationale of this change. However, such notice
provides additional opportunities for negotiation or collusion between client and the
CRA.
Supply side issues in the rating market raise serious questions about the reliability
of this informational service, but there are also issues on the demand side. These
stem largely from the Mexican gubernatorial political system. There are 31 states
in Mexico plus the Federal District (Mexico City). The governor who heads the
state’s executive is elected by popular vote for a term of at most six years. Each
governor may only serve a single term. Nevertheless, the career of a governor does
not end with his term. State executives from the three main parties tend to be
strong candidates for their parties’ presidential nominations, and even politicians
who do not run for the nation’s highest office can provide critical support for other
presidential hopefuls (Langston, 2010). Therefore, there are still strong incentives
for a governor to keep his party in power in his state, and to make its financial status
appear as favorable as possible.
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A rating downgrade has unfavorable consequences for the reelection probability of
the incumbent party. First of all, the news of the rating downgrade is published in
the mainstream media, with negative references to budget imbalances or increases
in public debt. Second, current bank loans of the state have variable interest rates
that rise with rating downgrades.1 Third, banks have restrictions on the riskiness
of the assets they are able to buy. When there is a rating downgrade, the pool of
potential investors in the state falls. Clearly, a government prefers to avoid ratings
downgrades. Assuming that voters associate voting downgrades with either a bad
economy, or more debt and more expensive debt service, governors will prefer to
avoid downgrades during electoral periods.
Both the CRAs and the state governments, then, might want to control the timing
of rating downgrades despite regulations enjoining them from doing so. In order to
analyze whether it is indeed the case in gubernatorial elections in Mexico we need
to consider the CRAs’ own accounts of how ratings are arrived. It could be that
the observed changes in ratings just reflect different CRA methodologies. It turns
out that all three international CRAs consider similar factors to assign their grades.
These factors include: 1) ability to increase taxes and tax base, 2) transparency,
control, and monitoring of the budget, 3) liquidity, 4) operating margin, 5) debt
burden, 6) share of interest payments as percentage of total expenditure, 7) interest
rates, 8) debt maturities, 9) debt purpose, 10) risk controls, 11) evaluation of the
local economy, 12) expenditure flexibility and, 13) support from the upper level of
government they would receive in case of financial distress.
1State debt in Mexico is peculiar since most of it is not sold as bonds to the public, but to banks
through private credit agreements. It is customary in these credit agreements to have a variable
rate that is a function of a base rate (usually close to inflation), plus a surcharge that is a function
of the state rating. These are usually specified in a table in the credit contract. When there is a
rating downgrade current interest payments go up, reducing the resources available to perform other
governmental activities.
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Clearly we will need to incorporate data that proxy for these factors in our analysis.
Several of these variables are likely correlated with any political budget cycle that
might be present, and so changes in ratings might be responding to these indicators
of public finance and not to the electoral calendar by itself. Moreover, as a byproduct
of the analysis of the political budget cycles, it is possible to see which indicators
the CRAs are responding to in assigning their ratings.
To test my hypotheses concerning political credit rating cycles, I collected ratings
data for the three biggest CRAs regarding the non-guaranteed risk of repayment of
each state in Mexico. Non-guaranteed obligations are those that are paid from the
general budget of the state. In contrast, structured debt stands for the obligations
that are guaranteed to be paid by drawing upon revenue from a particular source
(i.e. vehicle tax). These revenues flow into a trust, and the trust has the obligation to
pay the lenders. Non-guaranteed debt better reflects the current status of the budget
of the state since even relatively risky states can build a strong trust to increase
the rating of a particular asset. They cannot do so with the non-guaranteed debt.
Moreover, most short term debt is non-guaranteed. I also consider the national scale
rating to compare the risk of default of the state to the sovereign risk of sovereign
default of Mexico. This means that if Mexico as a country increases or decreases
its default risk, the default risk of the states will not change. This is necessary to
isolate their changes from the aggregate economic environment of the country. The
source of these data is the websites of the three international CRAs that operate in
Mexico (Fitch, 2015, Moody’s, 2015, S&P, 2015).
(Table 4.3 found at the end of this chapter)
Mexican states have a relatively recent history of issuing debt, and thus a relatively
recent history of credit ratings. The first two state ratings in Mexico were published
in 1999, but diffusion was rapid. By December 2000, 21 states had a rating. Today,
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every state is rated by at least one agency. 10 states are rated by only one CRA,
17 are rated by two, and 4 are rated by all three CRAs. If we translate the rating
scale linearly (see Table 4.3), the mean and median ratings are A, and has a standard
deviation of two notches (AA− to BBB+). The lowest rating in the sample was a
B+ for Quintana Roo after 20122 and the highest AA+ that has been reached by five
states in different periods. The evolution of the rating average has decreased slightly
in the last decade, from A+ in 2007 to A at the beginning of 2015. The sharpest
decrease occurred from May 2010 to June 2012.3
(Figure 4.1 found at the end of this chapter)
From 2005 to 2015 there were a total 117 changes in state credit ratings. The
number of changes is asymmetric: only four states had a constant rating, and five
experienced only one. In contrast, two states had ten changes in ratings.
(Figure 4.2 found at the end of this chapter)
Perhaps the most important component of the rating determination is public debt.
The total debt of states in Mexico was about 30 billion dollars at the end of 2014.
This amount corresponds to 2.9% of the GDP of Mexico. Although small by
some standards, subnational debt is a major topic of concern in Mexico. Debt has
increased twofold in six years, and has a growth rate of 12% annually (Diaz, 2015).
I include debt levels for the 31 states in Mexico, from the third quarter of 2005 to
the first quarter 2015 with data gathered from the Mexican Secretariat of Finance
and Public Credit. The Secretariat incorporates information from various sources,
including the self-reported debt by the states, banks, and diverse lenders (SHCP,
2015).
2There was a default for the state of Jalisco in December 2012 (getting a rating of D by Fitch
Ratings), but it was quickly paid, so it did not reach the quarterly cutoff used in this chapter.
3Note that this decrease was in a period of growth in Mexico, and oil prices were still high.
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In addition to the debt data, I also calculated the yearly budget balance defined as the
total revenue minus total expenditure. Chronic deficits in the public finances of a
state should increase the risk of default, and generates pressure to increase short and
long term public debt. In Mexico only about 3% of total public revenue is generated
at the state and municipal level, but about 52% of total public expenditure is made
by these levels of government (Diaz, 2015). In other words, almost all resources
the state uses for their operation and public investments come from federal transfers
(Langston, 2010). Therefore, the largest impact on ratings that is accountable to
the state government is on the expenditure side, so it is worthwhile to also track
expenditures separately in order to perform an accurate analysis.
I also considered other types of budgetmeasures, including operating balance (which
includes only operating expenditures of the government) and balance before public
investment (after paying interests and capital). Public investments are a very different
type of expenditure from operating expenditure, mainly for two reasons. First, it
is expected that public investments can increase government revenue in the future,
either directly (construction of a toll road), or indirectly by promoting growth or
welfare of the inhabitants of the state. Second, in case of financial distress it is
easier to reduce investments than to reduce wages or to fire public employees. The
National Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI) classifies public expenditure
according to its destination, and provides for each state series of public investments
that are comparable among them. I will use these series to control for public
investments, and normalize it by the size of the state budget.
Another component considered by the CRAs is the amortization schedule of the
debt. Although related to the amount of debt the state has, it should be considered
by itself. Even if the amount of debt is not large, if it is very short term the risk
of default increases. These schedules are not public, but it is possible to use the
amount of public expenditure directed toward debt service as a proxy. If the slope of
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the schedule is very aggressive, we should see large portions of the state expenditure
used to service debt. I incorporate the series of debt expenditure published by
INEGI (2015), and normalize the amount of expenditure by revenue.
CRAs also take into account the state of the economy, as a healthy economy is
needed in order to derive steady revenue from taxation. I use real change in state
GDP and state unemployment, also published by INEGI (2015).
Finally, all CRAs agree that entities without transparency are to be penalized in
their rating. Unfortunately there is no official index of transparency, nor do the
CRAs publish this qualitative characteristic of the states. However, a well-known
consulting company in Mexico, ARegional, has been publishing an index of fiscal
transparency for the states in Mexico since 2006. This index is called the Indice de
Transparencia y Disponibilidad de la Informacion Fiscal de las Entidades Federa-
tivas (ITDIF). It is published yearly, and assigns a rating between 0 and 100 to each
state (Aregional, 2015).
4.4 Model
Here I propose a parsimonious rating game that incorporates the incentives of the
CRAs and the officials discussed in the previous sections. The objective of this
model is to illustrate when the government has a credible threat of substituting a
CRA, and when the CRA panders and assigns a higher rating than it should during
the electoral period.
I model three players: Nature, a CRA, and the Government. The setup and timing
of the model goes as follows: (1) Nature assigns high (α) or low (1 − α) quality
to the government. (2) The CRA receives a signal s ∈ {h, `} with precision of ρ
regarding the quality of the Government, and assigns high (rh) or low rating (r`). (3)
The Government decides either to keep the rating, or withdraw it and pay C > 0 to
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another CRA to get a new rating. (4) In case the first rating was withdrawn, a second
CRA assigns high rating with probability γ ∼ Γ(·), or low rating with probability
1− γ. (5) Nature reveals (δ), or not (1− δ) the true state of the government. (6) The
election is held. If the true state was revealed it is used to determine the outcome of
the election. Otherwise the most recent rating is used.
This model has several implicit assumptions: (i) the Government needs to have
a rating; (ii) voters consider the face value of the rating, so they don’t do rating
unraveling, implying that the reelection probability is ceteris paribus higher when
having a higher rating; (iii) the Government can withdraw the rating without any
electoral penalty, but only has enough time to replace the CRA once before the
election; (iv) the Government has the belief that the other CRA has a probability
γ ∼ Γ(·) of assigning a high rating, and 1 − γ of assigning a low rating; (v) it is
cheaper in monetary terms to maintain a rating than to get a new one (C > 0); (vi)
all players are risk neutral.
Payoffs
If the CRA doesn’t get replaced, it receives the continuation value M . If the CRA
lies about the true state of the government and the true state is revealed, it incurs in
a reputation cost F.
If the Government gets reelected it gets a payoff of 1, otherwise it receives 0. In
both cases, if it replaced the CRA it incurs in the cost C. If the true quality of the
Government is revealed by the Nature, the rating is not considered in the reelection
probabilities: if the Government is high quality it gets reelected with probability
p(rh). If it is low quality it gets reelected with probability p(r`).
If the true state of the world is not revealed by Nature, the reelection probability
depends on the assigned rating. Let p(rh) be the probability the incumbent gov-
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ernment gets reelected given that the CRA assigned a high rating, and let p(r`) be
the probability of being reelected given that the CRA assigned the low rating. By
assumption (ii), p(rh) > p(r`).
Theorem
The CRA is more likely to manipulate ratings if its remuneration is high, switching
costs are low, the election is competitive and the result can switch with the rating,
if the probability of revealing the state4 is low, the reputation cost is low, and if the
size of the difference between the precision of the signal and the prior is small.
Proof
This game can be solved by backward induction. Since the Government plays after
the CRA, I will start by solving the Government problem first.
Government
The Government observes the assigned rating, and decides to keep or withdraw
rating. It is straightforward to see that if it is a high rating, the government will keep
it. Therefore I will focus on the case where it received a low rating.
If the government keeps the low rating it gets δp(·) + (1 − δ)p(r`). If it withdraws
it gets δp(·) + (1 − δ)(γp(rh) + (1 − γ)p(r`)) − C.5 Therefore, the government will
keep the rating if γ < C(1−δ)(p(rh)−p(r`)) . This inequality is intuitive, as the government
is more likely to withdraw the rating: (I) The more lenient the second CRA is.
(II) p(rn) − p(r`) is large (marginal electoral benefit of a high rating). This means
that if the government knows that is going to win or lose for sure, or the marginal
4This can also be interpreted as the probability the CRA is caught lying.
5Replace p(·) with p(rh) or p(r`) depending on the government has high or low quality, the same
inequality holds for both cases.
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benefit of a higher rating is negligible, then it will not withdraw the rating. (III) The
probability the true state of the world (δ) is revealed is small (marginal benefit of
having a rating), since the CRA only adds value when the true state is opaque.
CRA
The next step in the backward induction process is to take the rating withdrawal
cutoff from the Government, incorporate it in the payoffs of the CRA, and solve
for the optimal rating assigning strategy. Recall the precision of the signal (s) the
CRA receives about the true state of the world is ρ. That is, pr(sw = w) = ρ, with
w ∈ (h, `). Also recall the prior of state h is α, and state ` is 1 − α. Therefore, the
posteriors are the following:
pr(h|sh) = pr(` |s`) = αραρ+(1−α)(1−ρ) and pr(h|s`) = pr(` |sh) = α(1−ρ)α(1−ρ)+ρ(1−α)
CRA observes high signal
If the CRA gives a high rating it has an expected payoff of:
M +
( (1 − α)(1 − ρ)
αρ + (1 − α)(1 − ρ)
)
(δ)(−F)
If the RA gives low rating the expected payoff is:
Γ
(
C
(p(rh) − p(r`))(1 − δ)
)
M +
(
ρα
αρ + (1 − α)(1 − ρ)
)
(−F)δ
Therefore it assigns high rating if
M
(
1 − Γ
(
C
(p(rh) − p(r`))(1 − δ)
))
− δF
(
1 − α − ρ
αρ + (1 − α)(1 − ρ)
)
> 0 (4.1)
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CRA observes observe low signal
If it assigns high rating its expected payoff is:
M − δF
(
ρ(1 − α)
α(1 − ρ) + ρ(1 − α)
)
If it assigns low rating its expected payoff is:
MΓ
(
C
(p(rh) − p(r`))(1 − δ)
)
− δF
(
ρ(1 − α)
α(1 − ρ) + ρ(1 − α)
)
Therefore, the RA will assign a high rating if:
M
(
1 − Γ
(
C
(p(rh) − p(r`))(1 − δ)
))
− δF
(
ρ − α
α(1 − ρ) + ρ(1 − α)
)
> 0 (4.2)
Results
From equations (4.1) and (4.2) above, I can derive some predictions from the model.
The CRA is more likely to manipulate ratings if its remuneration (M) is high,
switching costs (C) are low, the election is competitive and the result can switch
with different ratings (p(rh) − p(r`)), if the probability of revealing the state6 (δ) is
low, the reputation cost (F) is low, and if the size of the lie (ρ − α, how much more
precise your information is with respect to the prior) is small. Also, the intuitive
conclusion that it is more likely that the CRA assigns a high rating when it receives
the high signal holds.
6This can also be interpreted as the probability the CRA is caught lying.
115
Two interesting predictions of the model are testable: only negative ratings will be
postponed (positives are not), and the more competitive the election, the more likely
we are to observe the postponement of negative ratings until after the election. From
this two testable observations I derive the following hypotheses, which will be tested
using the data described in the previous sections:
1. CRAs have incentives to delay rating downgrades for governments until the
election has passed
2. This delay is more likely to occur if the election is very competitive
4.5 Empirical Analysis
The first indication that ratings announcements might be influenced by the electoral
calendar is that we observe a disproportionately large number of rating downgrades
after elections, compared to a relative large number of rating upgrades before elec-
tions; as we can see in Table 4.4, we observe rating upgrades twice as often in
the year preceding the election than afterwards. Meanwhile, we observe more than
twice the number of downgrades after the election than before the election.
(Table 4.4 found at the end of this chapter)
In Mexico, gubernatorial elections are not held at the same time in all states. Each
state has its own electoral calendar, so it is possible to compare the average rating
of states with and without election during the same period. Figure 4.3 considers
for each election, state, and CRA its rating for the four quarters before and after the
election compared to the average rating of all states in the same period. We can
see that ratings are higher before elections. Average ratings between the fourth and
second quarter before the election are 2%-3% higher, and this amount monotonically
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decreases in time, reaching an average of 3% lower on the fourth quarter after the
election.
(Figure 4.3 found at the end of this chapter)
So far the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of political credit rating cycles.
However, it is necessary to incorporate in the analysis the variables that the CRAs
consider in their methodology to see if these variables account for this variation in
ratings around the elections. Changes in ratings might reflect true changes in the
creditworthiness of the state. These changes in creditworthiness can be measured
using the indicators of public finance used by the CRAs themselves, and may reflect
a political budget cycle.
Econometric analysis
In order to test for the existence of a political credit rating cycle, apart from any po-
litical budget cycle that may exist in the Mexican gubernatorial elections, I estimate
the following equations:
∆Ratingi jt = β1preelectionit + β2postelectionit +
∑
k
βkXkit + i jt (4.3)
Upgradei jt = β1preelectionit + β2postelectionit +
∑
k
βkXkit + i jt (4.4)
Downgradei jt = β1preelectionit + β2postelectionit +
∑
k
βkXkit + i jt (4.5)
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In all equations the subindex i stands for state, the subindex j ∈ {Fitch,Moody′s, S&P}
for CRA, and t for the time period. For model 4.3, I use fixed effects model. In
the other two equations, I use both a linear probability model and conditional logit
model.
The dependent variable∆Ratingi jt in the first equation is the first difference between
the assigned rating to state i by CRA j in period t and period t − 1. I assume the
rating scale is linear, and assign a numerical value between 0 and 15 to each rating,
where 15 corresponds to AAA (or Moody’s Aaa), 14 is AA+ (or Moody’s Aa1),
and the other ratings are coded analogously (See Table 4.3). The rating assigned to
period t is the rating the state had the last day of the quarter.
The other two dependent variables are dichotomous and reflect whether there was
a rating upgrade or rating downgrade from one quarter to the next. This metric
makes the results independent from the assumption of the linear values assigned to
the rating scale. The variableUpgradei jt takes the value of 1 if the rating for state i
by CRA j at the end of period t is strictly larger than the rating at the end of period
t − 1, and the variable takes the value of 1, if the rating in period t is strictly lower
than the rating in period t − 1.
The coefficients of interest in these regressions are β1 and β2 . The coefficient β1
estimates the change in the variable of interest attributed to being a pre-electoral
period. The variable preelectionit is dichotomous, and indicates whether period t
corresponds to one of the four quarters preceding a gubernatorial election in state i.
Analogously, β2 estimates the change in the variable of interest attributed to being a
post-electoral period. The variable postelectionit indicates whether the observation
corresponds to one of the four quarters after the gubernatorial election. According
to my hypotheses, I expect β1 to be positive and β2 to be negative for the models.
That is, I expect ratings to be higher before the election (or having an increased
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probability of observing an upgrade before the election), and the rating to be lower
after the election (or have a lower probability of observing an upgrade after the
election). Conversely, I expect the opposite signs for downgrades. If we are going
to observe a downgrade, it is more likely to be after the election has occurred.
I include as controls variables that the CRAs use to determine ratings, using variables
Xkit . These controls include debt over revenue, increase in debt over revenue,
percentage change of state GDP, fiscal balance over revenue, expenditure related to
public investments over total expenditure, debt expenditure over total expenditure,
and transparency. Without these controls we could potentially misattribute the
change in ratings to the incentives of the CRA, when they could just be adjusting
ratings due to actual changes in the status of public finances.
The expected signs of the parameters attributed to these controls are the ones that
reflect the likelihood of the state to have the resources needed to pay its obligations.
Thus, we expect increases in ratings to be positively correlated with a positive
budget balance, an increase in revenue, a larger fraction of the budget directed
toward public investments, and an increase in economic growth. Conversely, we
expect that increases in debt, increase in expenditure, and deficits to be negatively
correlated with credit ratings.
The final component of the model are fixed effects. I incorporate both state×rating
agency, and time fixed effects. The state × rating agency fixed effects control for
unobserved time invariant characteristics of the states. I am thus allowing each CRA
to have a different time invariant rating criteria for each state they grade. The time
fixed effects control for the unobserved trends that are common to all states in the
country.
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Empirical Results
Rating change and the elections
Results for rating changes and their relation to the electoral calendar are reported
in Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. Table 4.6 shows the estimates of the model for first
differences in ratings, according to the scale in Table 4.3. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 show
the estimates for the other two models which specify the dependent variable as the
dichotomous upgrade and downgrade, respectively.
In all three tables we observe the same pattern during the pre-electoral period. There
is no variation (either up or down) attributed to being in quarters before the election
(see row preelection in Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8). All estimates in this period are
statistically insignificant for both changes in rating and for the dichotomous models
of upgrade and rating downgrade. This result is robust with and without controls,
to the non-linearity of the model, and state × CRA and period fixed effects. This is
consistent with what I expected, since there is no incentive to delay the rating when
it is going to increase. On the other hand, it would also make sense for the CRA to
make an additional effort to have increase in ratings before the election. Perhaps the
reason we do not observe a positive estimation for preelectoral upgrades is the low
number of upgrades (only ten) around the elections for this sample. Moreover, rating
upgrades get less attention in the media compared to rating downgrades, making the
marginal benefit of the adjustment in the rating smaller.
I expected to observe less rating downgrades in the preelectoral period compared to
non-electoral years. That is, I expected the coefficient of preelection in Table 4.8 to
be negative, but the estimates are always indistinguishable from zero. It is possible
this is a result of the very small number of rating changes in preelectoral period.
In the post-electoral period the results are strongly consistent with the hypothesis
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that rating downgrades are postponed until after the election. The probability of
observing a rating downgrade in the quarters after an election is higher than in
the non-electoral quarters. In Table 4.6 we see that quarters after an election have
lower ratings (.1 less notches) on average compared to non-electoral quarters. This
estimation is robust to the introduction of controls and fixed effects. When I use the
dichotomous variable downgrade instead of rating level I reach the same conclusion.
The marginal effect of the variable postelection in Table 4.8 indicates how much
more likely it is to see a rating downgrade after an election.This variable is positive
and statistically significant in almost all specifications. It is 2.5%-3.5% more likely
to observe a rating downgrade for each quarter in the next four quarters afteran
election compared to non-electoral quarters. This estimation might look small, but
recall that the post-electoral period is defined as four quarters, so the probability
compounds to 10%-15% yearly.
The variable postpostelection is dichotomous, and takes the value of 1 if the
observation is on the four quarters after a post electoral period, or equivalently,
if the observation is on the quarters 5-8 posterior an election. This variable was
included to observe whether the downgrade associated with an election was followed
by a subsequent increase, suggesting mean reversion. The results do not indicate
that this is the case. In almost all models, the variable postpostelection goes in
the expected direction of a mean reversion, but it is not sizable and does not reach
statistical significance.
CRA methodology control variables
In general, the estimated coefficients for these controls go in the direction expected
by the methodology of the CRAs. Increases in debt (∆Debt/Revenue) are associ-
ated with reductions in ratings: a decrease in .45 notches when debt over revenue
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increases 100%(Table 4.6, columns 4 and 5). This is consistent when using the
variable upgrade. The probability of observing a rating upgrade decreases 4%
when debt over revenue increases 100% (Table 4.7, columns 4 and 5), and increased
likelihood of having a rating decreases: it is 10% more likely to have a ratings
downgrade when debt over revenue increases 100% (Table 4.8, columns 4 and 5).
Similarly, positive budget balances (Balance/Revenue) are associated with higher
ratings (Table 4.6), increased probability of a rating upgrade (Table 4.7), and a
decreased probability of a rating downgrade (Table 4.8). Having a larger percentage
of total expenditure as public investment (Investment/Exp) is positively correlated
with rating increases and negatively correlated with rating decreases (Tables 4.7 and
4.8 respectively).
There are also variables related to CRA methodology that do not appear to be
significant in determining changes in ratings, upgrades, or downgrades. Change in
state GDP (∆%GDP ) rarely reaches statistical significance in the proposed models.
Total debt over disposable revenue (Debt/Revenue) is not significant for changes
in rating levels and rating downgrades, although it is associated with increased
likelihood of receiving a rating upgrade (Table 4.7).
Rating Changes and Election Competitiveness
As indicated above there are also incentives for the CRA to adjust ratings as a
function of the competitiveness of the election. The threat of withdrawing a bad
rating is much more serious, which means that CRAs face additional pressure to
delay ratings downgrades. We thus expect it to be more likely to observe a delay in
a downgrade when the election is competitive.
To test this prediction, I partition the sample of elections according to the closeness
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of the results.7 I consider an election as close if the difference between the winner
and the runner-up was within 10% of the valid (non-null) votes.8 Analogously, an
election is defined to be a landslide if the difference between the first and second
place was more than 10%. The median difference in this sample between the first
and second place is 7.32%. As it turns out, my results are robust to the alternative
definition of closeness.
We observe the predicted result in the data, even when controlling for variables that
could be affected by the political budget cycle, and which could also be affected by
the competitiveness of the election. Consider first the model that incorporates the
change in rating level as the dependent variable (Table 4.9). Here the variables of
interest, preelection and postelection, include their interactions with the closeness
of the election. The main result is consistent with our hypothesis. We observe more
rating decreases in the period after the election when elections are competitive.
Moreover, this decrease is robust to the covariates attributed to the political rating
cycle, while for landslide elections it is not (Compare Close ∗ Postelection and
Landslide ∗ Postelection in columns 4 and 5 in Table 4.9). I estimate that the
decrease in rating for the post electoral period for close elections is around .12
notches. This result persists after specifying fixed effects.
The dichotomous variable equations produce similar results. There is an increased
likelihood of observing a downgrade in postelectoral periods of close elections.
In the linear probability model (Table 4.11, columns 1 and 2) the probability of
observing a rating downgrade when the election was close, everything else constant,
is 3.7-4.4% higher than in a non-electoral period.
7According to my assumptions, a change in ratings might change the electoral result, so it would
be better to have poll data to better estimate the incentives of the CRA to adjust the change in ratings.
This information is not available, so I use the actual electoral results as a substitute.
8Recall that Mexico has a multi-party system.
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Competitiveness and CRA methodology as controls
The coefficients estimated here for other covariates do not significantly change from
the baseline model, i.e. without electoral results. Increases in debt are associated
with decreases in ratings, and, when using the dichotomous variables, there is
decreased probability of seeing rating upgrades, and increased probabilities of rating
downgrades. More favorable budget balances are associatedwith increases in ratings
and, when using dichotomous variables, increased probabilities of rating upgrades,
and decreased probabilities of rating downgrades. Also, if a large percentage of the
total expenditure is used to finance public investments it is less likely to observe
rating downgrades. The variables that were not correlated with changes in ratings,
e.g. change in state GDP, transparency, and expenditure in debt in the baseline
model, are still not correlated when I control for competitiveness of the election.
Differences by CRA
The results suggest that there is heterogeneity among CRAs and the political credit
rating cycle. As we see in Table 4.12, Moody’s and Fitch are more likely to
downgrade ratings after an election. Standard & Poor’s, in contrast, seems to
change its ratings independently of the electoral calendar. Note that for this exercise
we have to use random effects, since the fixed effects would be collinear with the
CRA variables.
Unexpected change in party, change in risk?
Another possible explanation of the downgrades after the election could be that
CRAs might not expect the results of the election, and that they downgrade in
reaction to the electoral surprises. In order to test this, I compare the number of
rating downgrades after the election when the incumbent party lost the election by a
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relatively small margin to the same case when the incumbent party won the election.
If the aforementioned hypothesis is correct, we should observe a larger number of
rating downgrades when the incumbent party lost the election.
To test this, I use the same bandwidth of the previous section (10%) to define a close
election. The distribution of the plurality of elections in the sample can be seen in
Figure 4.4. The shaded regions in the figure show the number of quarters with close
elections considered to generate Table 4.5.
(Figure 4.4 found at the end of this chapter)
As we can see in Table 4.5 changes in party are not driving my results. In fact,
only three downgrades in the post electoral period correspond to a change in party
for close elections. For most of of the downgrades in competitive elections the
incumbent party retained control of the government. Therefore we can conclude
that it is not an unexpected change in the party in power what it is triggering rating
downgrades after the election.
(Table 4.5 found at the end of this chapter)
4.6 Conclusions, Policy Implications, and Further Research
This chapter extends the literature of the conflict of interest of CRAs to the public
finance and political economy domain. I conclude that CRAs are delaying rating
downgrades during electoral periods, especially if the election is very competitive.
My empirical results using data from gubernatorial elections in Mexico between
2005 and 2015 suggest that there is an increased probability of rating downgrades
after the election, which cannot be explained by the variables mentioned in rating
methodologies. I conclude that quarters posterior to an election decrease .1 notches
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on average compared to non-electoral quarters. Similarly, I concluded that it is
2.5%-3.5% more likely to observe a rating downgrade for each quarter in the next
four quarters posterior to an election compared to non-electoral quarters.
Regarding the competitiveness of the election, my empirical results show that the
decrease in rating after the election is more pronounced for close (competitive)
elections. I estimate that the decrease in rating for the post electoral period for close
elections is around .14 notches, while for landslide elections it is not statistically
significant. Similarly, the probability of observing a rating downgrade when the
election was close is (everything else constant) about 4% higher than in a non-
electoral period.
These results are in line with the hypothesis that there exists a conflict of interest
when the CRA rates a government that is paying for its services. The solution to
this problem is not easy. Regulations like paying upfront the cost of rating would
not prevent hidden arrangements between raters and clients. In corporate finance
some authors like Mathis et al. (2009) have proposed the creation of a centralized
depository or contract platform, who would be in charge of both hiring the CRAs,
and be requested and be paid for a rating. In this case the agency would remove the
direct contact between clients and CRAs. The problem with this approach in this
case is that the clients are governments themselves, so the centralized depository
would itself have the conflict of interest in first place. If the depository were to be
run by the federal government, there would be still partisan bias towards governors
who are from the same party of the president.
I propose making it mandatory to be rated by all CRAs for all states. In practice,
this would be on average incorporating a little more than one agency per state, and
the cost of an additional rating is negligible compared to the total state budget.
Since it has been shown that the ratings are indeed informative for taking investment
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decisions, the potential social benefits would be much larger than the cost. In this
case, the threat of removing the CRA would be eliminated, with only the reputation
cost to provide accurate ratings remaining.
This research could be extended to other countries at the state or province level, in
particular Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina since their subnational governments are
rated as well. We expect conflicts of interest to be less monitored than in developed
countries. However, developed countries can also be a subject of study; for example
in the US. US states have in general very high and stable ratings, so there is not
enough variance to apply the same method I did in the Mexican case. However, the
lower levels of government have much more variance, and constantly refinance their
debt and sell bonds on the open market.
The continuous study of CRAs and governments is necessary to make sure that this
relatively new player in the democratic process is fulfilling its role as an independent
monitor and it is able to transmit accurate and unbiased information to voters and
investors.
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4.7 Tables
Table 4.1: Rated Securities by CRA
CRA Government Securities Other Securities Total
S&P 970,200 206,000 1,176,200
Moody’s 673,166 168,253 841,419
Fitch 194,086 107,066 301,152
DBRS 16,650 25,552 42,202
KBRA 37 20,340 20,377
EJR 0 19,994 19,994
A.M. Best 0 9,462 9,462
Morningstar 0 5,542 5,542
JCR 399 3,070 3,469
HR Ratings 277 0 277
Total 1,854,815 565,279 2,420,094
Table 4.2: Mexican Rated Securities by CRA
CRA Government Securities Other Securities Total
Fitch 483 1,319 1,802
S&P 135 861 996
Moody’s 221 467 688
Total 839 2,647 3,486
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Table 4.3: Rating Equivalences
Value Fitch Moody’sSP
15 AAA Aaa AAA
14 AA+ Aa1 AA+
13 AA Aa2 AA
12 AA- Aa3 AA-
11 A+ A1 A+
10 A A2 A
9 A- A3 A-
8 BBB+ Baa1 BBB+
7 BBB Baa2 BBB
6 BBB- Baa3 BBB-
5 BB+ Ba1 BB+
4 BB Ba2 BB
3 BB- Ba3 BB-
2 B+ B1 B+
1 B B2 B
0 B- B3 B-
Table 4.4: Changes in Rating by Period
Pre-election Post-election
Rating Upgrade 7 3
Rating Downgrade 8 21
Table 4.5: Changes in Rating by Incumbency
Pre-election Post-election
Incumbent Lost
Rating Upgrade 6 0
Rating Downgrade 2 3
Incumbent Won
Rating Upgrade 1 2
Rating Downgrade 4 11
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Table 4.6: Estimations - Changes in Rating
Dependent variable:
∆ State Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Preelection −0.030 −0.031 −0.016 −0.022 −0.015
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Postelection −0.130∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.109∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
Postpostelection 0.007 0.006 0.054∗ 0.006 0.022
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031)
Debt/Revenue 0.063 0.071∗
(0.040) (0.041)
∆Debt/Revenue −0.453∗∗∗ −0.474∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.102)
∆%GDP −0.430 −1.031∗
(0.346) (0.592)
Balance/Revenue 1.287∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗
(0.204) (0.214)
Investment/Exp 0.298 0.349
(0.238) (0.280)
DebtExp/Exp 0.023 0.009
(0.030) (0.031)
Transparency −0.002∗∗ −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 2,132 2,132 2,132 1,985 1,985
State*RA FE N Y Y Y Y
Period FE N N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 (within) 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.054 0.045
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.7: Estimations - Upgrades
Dependent variable:
Upgrade
panel panel
linear conditional logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Preelection −0.007 −0.005 0.001 −0.003 0.001 -0.102 0.633
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.453) (0.581)
Postelection −0.018∗ −0.019∗ −0.007 −0.016 −0.007 -0.966 -0.530
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.655) (0.817)
Postpostelection −0.006 −0.008 0.003 −0.012 −0.002 -0.652 -0.408
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.476) (0.583)
Debt/Revenue 0.037∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 1.407∗∗ 1.184
(0.014) (0.015) (0.711) (0.905)
∆Debt/Revenue 0.016 0.024 1.789 2.087
(0.036) (0.037) (1.455) (2.078)
∆%GDP 0.089 −0.097 2.335 -8.005
(0.126) (0.215) (5.590) (12.728)
Balance/Revenue 0.251∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 13.222∗∗∗ 14.002 ∗∗
(0.074) (0.078) (4.272) (6.678)
Investment/Exp 0.157∗ 0.142 8.556 ∗ 12.736 ∗
(0.087) (0.102) (4.360) (6.138)
ExpDebt/Exp 0.011 0.006 0.107 0.516
(0.011) (0.011) (0.409) (1.049)
Observations 2,133 2,133 2,133 1,985 1,985 1,078 1,078
State*RA FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Period FE N N Y N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.002 0.0003 0.012 0.009
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.8: Estimations - Downgrades
Dependent variable:
Downgrade
panel panel
linear conditional logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Preelection −0.001 −0.001 −0.008 −0.005 −0.006 -0.301 -0.418
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.454) (0.509)
Postelection 0.046∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.626∗ 0.313
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.346) (0.398)
Postpostelection 0.001 −0.001 −0.019 −0.006 −0.012 -0.364 -0.544
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.436) (0.470)
Debt/Revenue 0.005 0.004 -0.459 -0.476
(0.016) (0.017) (0.438) (0.493)
∆Debt/Revenue 0.105∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.617 2.208∗
(0.041) (0.042) (0.690) (1.149)
∆%GDP 0.008 0.148 -1.879 7.232
(0.142) (0.244) (4.647) (8.260)
Balance/Revenue −0.471∗∗∗ −0.417∗∗∗ -8.016∗∗∗ -4.844∗
(0.084) (0.088) (2.615) (2.752)
Investment/Exp −0.176∗ −0.255∗∗ -4.482 -10.407∗∗
(0.098) (0.116) (3.436) (4.709)
ExpDebt/Exp −0.011 −0.006 -0.325 0.008
(0.012) (0.013) (0.334) (0.437)
Observations 2,133 2,133 2,133 1,985 1,985 1,049 1,049
State*RA FE N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Period FE N N Y N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.038 0.031
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.9: Estimations- Changes in Rating by Competitiveness
Dependent variable:
∆ State Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Close*Preelection −0.008 −0.008 −0.011 −0.015 −0.014
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Landslide*Preelection −0.094∗∗ −0.093∗∗ −0.069 −0.048 −0.037
(0.045) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.052)
Close*Postelection −0.119∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Landslide*Postelection −0.155∗∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗ −0.078 −0.063
(0.044) (0.047) (0.049) (0.052) (0.054)
Debt/Revenue 0.061 0.070∗
(0.040) (0.041)
∆Debt/Revenue −0.453∗∗∗ −0.475∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.102)
∆%GDP −0.451 −1.064∗
(0.347) (0.588)
Balance/Revenue 1.300∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.218)
Investment/Exp 0.297 0.341
(0.238) (0.282)
DebtExp/Exp 0.023 0.010
(0.030) (0.031)
Observations 2,132 2,132 2,132 1,985 1,985
State*RA FE N Y Y Y Y
Period FE N N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 (within) 0.013 0.012 0.006 0.054 0.045
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.10: Estimations- Upgrades by Competitiveness
Dependent variable:
Upgrade
panel conditional
linear logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Close*Preelection 0.011 0.012 0.395 0.813
(0.012) (0.012) (0.486) (0.601)
Landslide*Preelection −0.028 −0.024 -13.560 -16.591
(0.018) (0.019) (627.130) (5039.782)
Close*Postelection −0.013 −0.009 -0.849 -0.800
(0.012) (0.013) (0.782) (0.913)
Landslide*Postelection −0.014 −0.006 -0.571 0.870
(0.019) (0.020) (1.102) (1.271)
Debt/Revenue 0.035∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 1.283 1.013
(0.015) (0.015) (0.702) (0.907)
∆Debt/Revenue 0.018 0.025 1.770 2.477
(0.036) (0.037) (1.427) (2.148)
∆%GDP 0.077 −0.107 3.563 -7.029
(0.127) (0.214) (6.054) (12.973)
Balance/Revenue 0.237∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗ 12.699∗∗∗ 14.212∗∗
(0.076) (0.079) (4.268) (6.691)
Investment/Exp 0.167∗ 0.153 7.920∗ 12.229∗∗
(0.087) (0.102) (4.349) (6.067)
Observations 1,985 1,985 1,078 1,078
State*RA FE Y Y Y Y
Period FE N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 (within) 0.012 0.009
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.11: Estimations- Downgrades by Competitiveness
Dependent variable:
Downgrade
panel conditional
linear logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Close*Preelection 0.007 0.009 0.127 0.153
(0.013) (0.014) (0.503) (0.551)
Landslide*Preelection −0.029 −0.034 -1.055 -1.806
(0.020) (0.021) (0.884) (1.105)
Close*Postelection 0.044∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 0.913∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.379) (0.415)
Landslide*Postelection 0.018 0.012 0.037 -0.537
(0.021) (0.022) (0.605) (0.695)
Debt/Revenue −0.006 −0.006 -0.451 -0.507
(0.023) (0.023) (0.440) (0.503)
∆Debt/Revenue 0.106∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.608 2.315
(0.041) (0.042) (0.691) (1.166)
∆%GDP 0.005 0.139 -2.485 5.752
(0.143) (0.243) (4.639) (8.342)
Balance/Revenue −0.496∗∗∗ −0.447∗∗∗ -8.908∗∗∗ -7.076∗∗
(0.085) (0.090) (2.658) (2.951)
Investment/Exp −0.166∗ −0.233∗∗ -3.533 -8.489 ∗
(0.098) (0.116) (3.492) (4.745)
Observations 1,985 1,985 1,049 1,049
State*RA FE Y Y Y Y
Period FE N Y N Y
Adjusted R2 (within) 0.038 0.031
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 4.12: Estimations by CRA
Dependent variable:
∆Rating Upgrade Downgrade
(1) (2) (3)
Preelection×Fitch −0.014 −0.012 −0.001
(0.043) (0.016) (0.018)
Preelection×Moodys 0.021 −0.007 −0.009
(0.043) (0.016) (0.018)
Preelection×SP −0.052 0.022 −0.005
(0.055) (0.021) (0.023)
Postelection×Fitch −0.181∗∗∗ −0.016 0.072∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.017) (0.019)
Postelection×Moodys −0.086∗∗ 0.002 0.042∗∗
(0.043) (0.016) (0.018)
Postelection×SP −0.013 −0.035 −0.023
(0.062) (0.023) (0.026)
Postpostelection×Fitch −0.034 −0.017 0.005
(0.044) (0.016) (0.018)
Postpostelection×Moodys 0.069 0.008 −0.004
(0.042) (0.016) (0.018)
Postpostelection×SP −0.026 −0.009 −0.007
(0.059) (0.022) (0.025)
Observations 1,985 1,985 1,985
Other covariates Y Y Y
FE N N N
R2 0.098 0.016 0.063
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.015 0.062
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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4.8 Figures
Figure 4.1: Rating Distributions
0
200
400
600
B+ BB−
BB BB+
BBB−
BBB
BBB+
A− A A+ AA−
AA AA+
AAA
Rating
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 4.2: Timeline - Rating Average
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Figure 4.3: Rating Deviations in the Electoral Cycle
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of Electoral Competitiveness
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